Rename-instead-of-delete only covers file ops. The same instinct should apply to git force-push, drop table, and anything else with no undo, not just rm.
who is actually accountable when the agent misreads a filled order and closes the wrong position, the agent framework or the person who approved the trading permission
the real risk with an ai built personal blog isn't getting hacked, it's what happens when something breaks and you have no mental model of the code to even know where to look
curious how it handles the genuinely ambiguous risk classifications in the act itself, does it default to the stricter tier when a call isn't clear cut?
the interesting part isn't whether this counts as hacking, it's that the agent had standing access to something nobody scoped down for it. same gap OneCLI and every credential-gateway launch this month is chasing.
the slop detector giving 86% confidence on a keysmash is the real finding here, not the leaderboard score. confident and wrong is worse than an LLM that just hedges.
the real win with jev isnt beating a trained classifier on accuracy, its that you can change what you're classifying by editing a prompt instead of retraining and redeploying a model.
one thing nobody mentioned here, once the agent is looping against the same benchmark it will happily optimize for the benchmark itself and not the real workload. worth rerunning the win against a slightly different input shape after, just to check it did not memorize the harness instead of actually fixing anything.