I feel fortunate. I get to solve puzzles with a lot of my time.
39 karma · joined February 9, 2013
I feel fortunate. I get to solve puzzles with a lot of my time.
I feel fortunate. I get to solve puzzles with most of my time.
StartSSL is one place where you can get a free cert for your website today (and yes, they charge for revocation, but revocation is pretty ineffective anyway). I got a free cert from them, but my mobile browser doesn't trust it, so I decided to shell out $10 for a cert that's more widely auto-trusted by browsers. Not a huge cost, IMO.
But this is something clients can actually do today, without the need for a new protocol or any awareness on the server side. URL isn't HTTPS? Don't load it. I actually did a Firefox plugin that implements this, called http-nowhere.
Regardless of the form of PKI employed, there's going to be a cost associated with validating the identity of the parties you're communicating with.
For the average Joe, certs that require domain ownership validation are pretty cheap these days -- certainly on par with domain name registration fees. As with domain names, people need to just start treating it as a necessary cost of running a website.
To be clear, I am far from a fan of X.509, but I'm not holding my breath for something better to come along (and be widely deployed) this decade. So let's use what we've got.
I recognize that getting consensus is hard work, but I don't think creating another encryption-optional protocol and letting vendors duke it over security is going to end well for the users.
HTTP is a deployed protocol with lots of existing
stakeholders, like proxy vendors, network operators,
corporate firewalls and so on. Requiring encryption
with HTTP/2 means that these stakeholders get
disenfranchised.
I'd like to hear the arguments of the potentially-disenfranchised stakeholders first hand. Is it mainly because it makes it harder to sell or use products that allow traffic snooping?I will give you that web PKI sucks, but I would rather have a bit more assurance (even if imperfect) that the site I'm pulling artifacts from is indeed the one I intended to retrieve them from, even if I have a good signature + signer verification mechanism in place.
Unfortunately, ditching the root CAs is way harder than it should be, and flat out impossible in a lot of environments. Compulsory trust isn't trust.