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"encryption is good at ensuring data confidentiality in the near term"

Very interesting. I knew that state actors syphon everything, but I assumed it was since they can afford and it's a Hail Mary if they stumble on a breakthrough or a side channel. Some further Qs:

- What's near term? - What's in the far term? - I thought that encryption could be made arbitrarily more difficult to crack at little cost. Is this not the case? - Does this future assume quantum computing is feasible?

Finally, if encryption is no longer believed to be safe in the long term, shouldn't we be moving towards making one-time pads practical? Given modern data storage densities, it's not that unpractical for many use cases (say embassy communication, etc)

I need an expert to explain something to me:

If we enable E2E encryption on the end points, why do we care if Huawei makes it since the local gov't retains local monopoly of force? The reasons I can think of are:

- meta-data - denial of infrastructure. This is a big reason and a good enough reason.

Aside from reason number two, I really don't see the security threat. Not to minimize the threat of meta-data, but I think, on a national level, it too is solvable for the sovereign (by, for example, having phones make fake random calls to each other to poison the information)

EDIT: For the record, my question is genuine - I really want to understand this - and not some backhanded way to defend Huawei

Pretty much sums it

Flicker sucks, but LEDs are much more efficient when driven hard. So PWM is much more energy efficient for a given luminosity.

That being said, if you're not on battery power, we're talking negligible energy. So, put a current source in there and stop giving me a seizure with your flicker.