1,534 karma · joined July 15, 2010
- I̶n̶v̶e̶n̶t̶ ̶a̶u̶t̶o̶n̶o̶m̶o̶u̶s̶ ̶h̶a̶c̶k̶i̶n̶g̶ ̶m̶a̶c̶h̶i̶n̶e̶
- G̶o̶o̶g̶l̶e̶ ̶"̶s̶a̶n̶d̶b̶o̶x̶i̶n̶g̶"̶
- G̶o̶o̶g̶l̶e̶ ̶"̶s̶c̶o̶p̶e̶d̶ ̶A̶P̶I̶ ̶k̶e̶y̶s̶"̶
- Google "ACLs"
- Google "egress controls"
- Google "Oh Wasps Top 10"
But you are defending MS, conflating a bunch of things, mainly full disk encryption and cloud backups.
There's a big difference between Apples cloud backup which has documented behavior and a backdoor. I'm also fairly confidant in Apple's full disk encryption, they've gone to court to defend it. There also a lot more data points we can use to judge Apple vs Microsoft on privacy and security, and MS comes out looking bad.
Securing Microsoft products is busy work while waiting to have it undercut by the next wave of MS’s insane tech debt and greed. And now backdoors!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2eBDU5ea0A&t=392s
> "That largely depends on what an officer does outside of work. If someone is involved in corrupt dealings, and in fact, I know very few who aren't, then they reason like this. Can this messenger be monitored by internal security officers? Previously, many used WhatsApp. Almost no one used telegram because there's a wellfounded belief that this messenger is to some extent controlled by the Russian authorities. People used signal. Some use three months, but all that has now been shut down again. Why is it monitored? I think they're worried about a possible coup and trying to limit the ability to coordinate mass actions via communication channels from abroad. Hence the Max messenger. So now most security officers have switched to Chatty. That's a Dubai based messenger, but it's definitely not a universal remedy. Some have moved to Zangi, which is [clears throat] an Armenian app that markets itself as American. When it comes to targeting the opposition, the state will always find the resources. It's one of the main priorities, more important than any financial or commercial issue, even more than counterterrorism."
Having said all that, it's probably something that could be dropped from the readme. I'll edit now.
edit: updated the readme. Thanks for taking the time to proof read it.
> Use shutdown when you can, PanicLock when you can't. Shutting down is the most secure option—but when you need your Mac locked now and you'll be back in five minutes, PanicLock is your answer.
*PanicLock* - Fast "oh shit" button - Lid closed when in transit. - Instant lock (1 second). Disables Touch ID immediately - Preserves your session - Back to work in minutes
*Full Shutdown* - Maximum security - Purges encryption keys - Fully locks FileVault - Takes time to shutdown & restart - Kills your session
> "PanicLock fills a gap macOS leaves open: there is no built-in way to instantly disable Touch ID when it matters. Biometrics are convenient day-to-day, and sometimes preferable when you need speed or want to avoid your password being observed. But in sensitive situations, law enforcement and border agents in many countries can compel a biometric unlock in ways they cannot with a password. PanicLock gives you a one-click menu bar button, a customizable hotkey, or an automatic lock-on-lid-close option that immediately disables Touch ID and locks your screen, restoring password-only protection without killing your session or shutting down."
I've more details on the apps landing page - paniclock.github.io
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/washington-post-raid-pro...
Edit: I've a lot more details about the legality and precedence on the apps landing page https://paniclock.github.io/
It's a pity going public isn't worth it anymore.
> “(Ireland, informal, UK, dialect) To come to understand; twig, cotton on.”
Passkeys are a step in the right direction, ironically for the exact reason the author advises caution. We've been telling people to "store your backup key somewhere safe" for the best part of a decade now, and your average Erika hasn't got on well with that at all. Locking themselves out and losing data left, right and centre.
If you've worked at any kind of scale you'll know well that a certain percentage of users will lose their data with E2EE, full stop. It's just different from everything else they've ever used. These are the same people who'd be lost without the "forgot password" link, and there's no shame in that. That's just the reality of it. And passkeys can help people like this to not lose their keys.
If the product is truly E2EE, the best options right now are the passkey implementations baked into Chrome or Apple. Windows, as ever, needs a bit of work, but the password managers seem to be picking up the slack well enough. We also need to educate people that with true E2EE there is no "forgot password" email. Passkeys and the tooling around them still have a ways to go, but we're getting there.
Does this mean Azure & AWS will have to stop offering Claude as a model?
> In practical terms, this replaces a lot of the awkward machinery behind encrypted systems. End-to-end messaging usually requires long-lived identity keys, recovery phrases, or some form of server-assisted key escrow. Encrypted SaaS products often rely on password-derived keys or server-stored wrapped keys for recovery. Using passkeys and the WebAuthn PRF shifts that root of trust into hardware-backed credentials that already exist on user devices, reducing both system complexity and the number of high-value secrets stored on servers.
I hope that makes the reason for my post clearer? Thank you for your comment, I'm pretty new to writing blog posts and your comment identified that I clearly hadn't properly communicated why I though the approach was novel or exciting. It might have been obvious to some, but having Moxie do it in a product makes it much easier to justify by coping his approach.