467 karma · joined July 29, 2008
Github: senorprogrammer.
Creator of WTF https://wtfutil.com
As it stands, they get to say they're patched while I remain vulnerable, and now it's my fault if my account is compromised if I don't get around to resetting my password (or they're a site I visited once, years ago, and forgot all about).
Simply updating OpenSSL without fixing passwords just shifts the onus to the users.
They make commercial routes look positively impregnable by comparison.
This, incidentally, is the same sort of thinking that sometimes kills experts in dangerous situations: the assumption that someone smarter than us must by definition know more than us, so we can be lackadaisical. Witness Snow Fall (http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2012/snow-fall/?forceredirec...)
Were I to work in a place with a 'git commits' metric for productivity, I'd happily commit each line individually, to ensure that any potential data loss was as limited as possible, of course.
To paraphrase Wally from Dilbert: "I'm writing myself a mini-van."
Recently I had a kid and got to experience the sleep-deprivation effects all over again except this time with one big difference: I work with an awesome team who were able to pick up the slack, and I was smart enough to know when to ask for help (once literally saying "I'm too stupid to do this now, can you do it?")
Sleep-deprivation is going to continue to be endemic in our industry (not just amongst start-ups, the twenty-somethings today are going to be having kids soon themselves). Instead of fighting through the slack, find ways to mitigate it; build your teams with people you can rely on to cover you when you're short.
Young me was much less paranoid than old me.
Paperclip and Carrierwave (I highly recommend Carrierwave) manage the actual storage of the file data (ie on S3) and the incorporation of the file into your ActiveRecord model (I'm glossing over a lot but hopefully you get the idea).
Basically, Dropzone would be a companion to your Rails-based file storage mechanism.
We should not necessarily ascribe to malice what can be explained through lack of functionality.
For the purposes of encrypting traffic to prevent eavesdropping, one of the recipients sending the unencrypted data to a third-party is not an attack vector of consideration. In your scenario the only viable measure is to send no data at all (aka "don't play").
Further scientific study in this field should be very interesting indeed.
Mostly this article makes me feel bad for its author. He must have spent a non-trivial amount of time writing this piece, and it serves no end. I suppose I just can't fathom why it made him feel good to write it.
Check out patio11's online talks for more rational.