A lot of folks pay a lot of money for legal services because they seem to think they need to hire the same lawyers as Facebook and Google. You hire those same service providers, don't be surprised how much you pay.
71 karma · joined April 19, 2017
A lot of folks pay a lot of money for legal services because they seem to think they need to hire the same lawyers as Facebook and Google. You hire those same service providers, don't be surprised how much you pay.
This is very different from the chip engineer scenario. It is the most important reason why non-lawyers are not allowed to own law firms. Because non-lawyers are not bound by rules that require them to put profit motives second in many circumstances.
Then let's say they have a dispute, with one having to leave after a year working together. The departed co-founder files a claim against the company for unpaid "wages."
Now, the two co-founders had knowingly worked together for that year for equity - they were bootstrapping. But the departed co-founder has a slam-dunk case against the company for unpaid wages and probably waiting time and other penalties (as well as attorneys' fees).
I think most people on here would think that's absurd. But that's the reality.
And in California, not only is the company liable, but the remaining founder may be personally liable, as well.
I sympathize with the idea that you shouldn't hire anyone until you can pay. But does the co-founder situation I described make clear the problem?
But this doesn’t seem to be enough, does it? These two factors would say that any company that can’t afford employees can simply not pay anyone who would otherwise be an exempt employee. I don’t see that as sufficient. There could be other criteria: 3) In addition to #1 and #2, the “employee” would have to own at least X% of the equity of the company 4) Or maybe just X% of the voting power of the company (even if not the economic ownership)?
Those are just examples. Or maybe part of the solution is protection in terms of a liquidity preference of sorts. If a company has a less-than-stellar M&A exit, preferred shareholders (investors) typically have a liquidation preference that ensures they get their money back before anyone else shares in the merger proceeds. This seems sensible as a matter of investor protection – they put in $X million and understandably want to recoup their investment before other shareholders get a windfall. This might mean, however, that an early employee who didn’t get paid in cash and only has common stock, might get nothing while an investor who put in a bunch of money is made whole. What is the rationale for the investor being made whole, but an employee who worked for free getting nothing? The law could, for example, require that upon liquidation, employees who worked for free get a certain amount of money. (The law already provides a preference for wages in the bankruptcy context, but this is different. I’m imagining a situation where companies would be able to lawfully hire certain people for payment only in equity, rather than cash.) I’m curious to hear your ideas. How do you change the law to match the reality that startups can’t usually pay employees at the earliest stages, while not ending up in a situation where unscrupulous employers can take advantage of employees?
The question I have is when the founders have acted in good faith and the company goes downhill, should the founders bear all the downside risk there?
I can see someone saying yes - if the company goes south, everyone should get the money they invested as shareholders back. But that's a different argument.
An additional question I'd ask - is some method of waiving liquidation preferences by the board (again, including the investor board member) a good idea from the perspective of aligning incentives?
Let's say the company has seen a downturn where there are two options at play: a sale at a value that would give the founders nothing, after the liquidation preference is exercised OR a risky (but legally defensible) Hail Mary business plan to bring the company back from the brink.
If the founders get nothing out of the sale, aren't they incentivized to choose the Hail Mary option? (Obviously there are other opportunity costs for the founders.) If the liquidation preference could be waived by the board, then that would give the founders an incentive to approve an "efficient" sale.
Note: I am suggesting the idea of the board approving the waiver, as opposed to the preferred shareholders, so that the waiver applied across the board to all preferred shareholders. And the investor board member would have to vote in the best interests of the company when voting in the role as a board member, as opposed to in their own self interest, which they do as a preferred shareholder.
All that being said, I don't think liquidation preferences are the place to focus on making "standard" term sheets more company friendly. I could write a lot about that...
This term sheet is a fair distillation of fairly standard terms. I think what adventured is looking for is something that moves the Overton Window as to what's "standard." I don't think YC was purporting to play that role here.
With organizations like the NVCA playing such a pivotal role in the terms of VC financings, I think it is critically important that thought be given on the founder side towards advocating more founder-friendly "standards."
If I had to guess, the Series A terms provide that in order to issue new shares on parity with or senior to Series A shares, the company needs to get Series A shareholder approval. In other words, to raise a Series B, he'd need to get Series A shareholder approval.
How does that fit in here? Well, the prior comments you received essentially point to two strategies:
1) Get the company into a position where VCs want to compete to invest in it; and/or 2) Simply make the company profitable so that a Series B isn't essential.
The problem with the requirement of getting Series A approval for the Series B is that, to an extent, the fact that other VCs might want to compete to provide better terms is somewhat irrelevant. The Series A VC can turn down any Series B term sheet it wants.
In other words, the real leverage is in strategy #2. Make the company profitable without the need for funding if at all possible.
Will that net your friend enough money to scale in the way millions in VC funding would? Quite possibly not. But at least it changes the negotiating dynamic with the Series A VC. If the Series A VC knows the company NEEDS Series B funding, then the VC knows it has veto power and can control the terms of the Series B. If the VC knows that the company is profitable and can live without any Series B funding, then suddenly the VC is in a weaker position - the company can "walk away" from the Series B negotiations altogether.
[Note for anyone reading: if you have the negotiating leverage in your Series A, rather than agreeing to the protective provision I mentioned above requiring Series A shareholders to agree to any Series B funding, see if the VC will agree to merely require the Series A BOARD MEMBER to approve a Series B round. This, of course, assumes that there is a Series A board member, of course, and will be a tough sell. But it, again, changes the dynamic. The Series A board member has fiduciary duties to the company and can't simply say no to competing Series B term sheets for self-interested reasons. But if the Series A shareholders have to approve the round in their role as shareholders, the same fiduciary obligations don't apply the same way.]
That's basically it.
If you qualified to do business in a particular state, you likely need to file something with that state surrendering your qualification to do business. That's a simple filing as well.
Any competent corporate attorney can handle this quickly and for not much cost.
1) 1x-2x multiplier isn't offbase historically. Remember, though, that not every niche brand can be maintained on a part-time basis without touching stock or things like that. So, when one thinks of, say, a 2x multiplier, the calculus on the part of the selling company is much different than yours (i.e. they are selling to cash in and avoid further expense, effort, etc..., as well as hedging risk, of course, which presumably is a goal you share). But it doesn't necessarily impact the acquiror's calculus - depending on the type of buyer, they are going to fit your brand into their existing sales infrastructure. So, the effort and expense you incur doesn't matter to them quite as much as you would think.
In other words, you might not be able to reasonably expect a much greater multiplier because this business is so easily self-maintaining. Instead, it might just not make sense for you to sell.
Mind you, this is assuming the acquiror has an infrastructure your brand would fit into. Other types of buyers may feel quite differently and could pay a hefty premium for a business like yours. Finding that type of buyer is something I'm not sure how to do.
2) How these transactions are structured depends in a large part on the type of buyer. And there are a lot more structuring variables than all cash vs. financing.
3) Tax perspective? Not sure how you are structured right now. You may be able to qualify for QSB treatment, which would exempt much sale value from capital gains taxation. But I'm not sure you are structured now to allow that (or if you are an entity at all). There are way too many variables in terms of tax implications and you just need to make sure you have an experienced tax attorney (or accountant, if they have the right experience) looking at your proposed deal structure and working with the main attorney representing you.
4) In terms of the type of lawyer, an experienced corporate and commercial business attorney makes sense. This is not the size of deal that would be cost effective at a large firm. So, maybe I'm biased given what I do, but I think you'd be looking for a smaller firm that has business M&A experience. PLEASE make sure you go to an attorney before you sign a term sheet. You'll have a much harder time negotiating things if you haven't done so at the term sheet stage.
Hope this is helpful and happy to answer other questions.
But this all begs two questions:
1) Is your interest in pursuing this new business strategy at all? If it is, who cares about the investor. You need to create a business plan anyway. Your first focus should be on what you want for your business going forward.
2) How is it that you plan to not involve your third partner? This has to be handled delicately and intelligently. Otherwise you will be facing a potential lawsuit and a definite cloud over your IP.
Investors care about deadweight on the cap table from an economic perspective, much more than from a voting perspective. This does nothing to help that.
Yes, future investors will want you to sign a drag-along with respect to a future M&A transaction, but that might be perfectly fine. Maybe you can offer some form of agreement to a weak drag-along?
Is the company a Delaware corp? If so, maybe suggest the company agree to exchange your common stock for something like Series FF Preferred (or sometimes called Founder Preferred). If an investor may be willing to buy you out in a future round, this would be the best way for you and the company.
Having a short meeting with an attorney before you negotiate this is not a bad idea, but I agree that it's not cost effective to have an attorney negotiate this for you. At this point, he may be amenable to an amicable resolution on terms you would be fine with.
The reason to speak with an attorney now is to understand better what resolution you want and how it could impact your business going forward. That depends on a number of factors, including whether you intend to seek outside funding.
If he isn't amenable to a resolution that would not hamper the business, then an attorney becomes critical. You need to figure out what leverage you have to force him into a settlement of some sort. That can be complicated.
Happy to answer any questions, if it would be helpful.
Second, I'd be curious what they are referring to as "disparagement." Is that defined in the agreement?
Third, I'm not sure what state you are in, but that might matter. I haven't researched the issue and there may be case law already. But my guy instinct is that this would violate public policy in a state like California, perhaps depending on what "disparagement" is meant to mean.
I'll give you one reason why. California, as you might know, is very hostile to restraints on ability to pursue a profession (most notable example - non-compete agreements). If you cannot disparage your employer post-employment, that may make it impossible to compete with them.
Of course, this depends on what disparagement means. Absent contract, the main restrictions on commercial speech that "disparage" a competitor are in the world of defamation and trade libel law (on a state level) and the Lanham Act/unfair competition law (largely on a federal level). This is gross oversimplification, but good enough for the moment.
Those laws generally require proof of falsity or misleading nature of the underlying speech.
A non-disparagement clause, on the other hand, is a contractual obligation that goes further than that. It CAN, depending on the wording, extend to truthful speech. And it often does.
Competitors need to be able to distinguish their products and services from each other - most notably in ways that promote their own services as "better" than the other or by noting flaws in their competitors products and services. This is part of healthy competition. Defamation, trade libel, and unfair competition laws all permit this.
But it's not necessarily possible with a non-disparagement clause. And, therefore, the ability to compete fairly is materially diminished.
I would note that even in California, there are exceptions to the public policy ban on non-competes in the M&A context. And that might be read to extend the public policy concerns around a non-disparagement clause. But the contractual terms need to be narrowly tailored. It has to terminate at some point. Perpetual restrictions are not enforceable.
TL;DR: This isn't normal. You're not overreacting.
That being said, there is a reason that salespeople are traditionally paid on a commission basis. Is there a reason you want to ignore that convention and, instead, detach compensation from being directly tied to each sale? This seems like an odd move, particularly when the prospective co-founder does not see himself as a salesperson.
You can grant equity on a non-time-based vesting schedule (i.e. performance-based vesting based on sales performance), if you are not ready to start paying cash or want to grant equity for some other reason.
But this person is simply untested in this role and you will not know in a couple of months whether he should have a significant equity stake in your company. So, traditional time-based vesting (and particularly with a magnitude of shares like that that would typically go to a co-founder) is a choice you are likely to regret.
There are a lot of other questions that come into play here - for example, is the angel investor a shareholder or do they have some sort of convertible security?
Startups go out of business all the time - the vast majority do. Your investor should know that, as should you debt holders.
This should be a simple process, but it seems like it's been dragged out way beyond what you should have to do with.
I'm a bit nervous that the investor's lawyers did your corporate documentation and you don't have it. I'm concerned that you may have been taken advantage of.
I would write the investor's lawyer and request copies of the documentation. He cannot withhold it because you didn't pay some legal bill.
If you want to take the risk, just send the investor a notice that you are quitting any position you have (director/officer/employee) of the company. And then just forget the whole thing.
If you want to mitigate risk, I'd find a lawyer who works with startups who can hopefully help you navigate this in a cost-efficient way.
Do you have a sense of the players that would potentially be interested in acquiring your company? If so, I would start using your network to reach out to those players.
An i-banker may be great if you are looking for a private equity-type deal. But if your potential acquirors are companies like Salesforce or Google or some other tech company, you might be better off exploring on your own.
To the extent you engage an investment banker, be very, very careful about what you sign. Those agreements can be incredibly onerous...
1) Due diligence requests are made by the investor, not offered by the company. So, it's not about the company's desire for full disclosure or the company's interest in complying with SEC regs. (SEC regs require certain types of disclosures in connection with certain types of placements of securities. The typical VC funding round doesn't require such disclosures.)
2) Yes, lawyers are in the business of decreasing transactional risk. But, relatedly though slightly different, the reason VC lawyer due diligence requests are so long is that lawyers are risk averse. There is no downside to the lawyers to add something to the DD list, but there is certainly a potential cost if they leave something off. And the junior lawyers who deal with these things aren't being paid for creativity or independent judgment...(Not a knock on them. It's just not what junior lawyers are tasked with.)
In a note/SAFE round, it is much less likely that there will be diligence.
When you say "pivoting to something completely different," are you going to be using IP developed as part of the current company? If so, starting a new company will be very difficult.
And the note holders don't want their money back, most likely. I mean, if you dissolve, they'll have no choice but to take it. But they were investing to get equity down the road. Query how you raised $2M and apparently haven't spent any of it. How long ago did you enter into these notes? I would have to imagine it was pretty recent. And you didn't know about the pivot then? That's possible, of course. But it's a concern the noteholders may have.
There are lots of strategies to move forward. But it's pretty fact specific. I think fab1an's advice is really the best.
I certainly understand the OP's concern about being fleeced here. It is a very fair and understandable concern. But the founders' claim that investors are being scared away could be very real.
It's a delicate balancing act because while the OP doesn't want to get taken advantage of, I'm sure he also doesn't want to engineer a situation where the company can't get funding and his shares become worthless.
That being said, they can't force you to do this and, if you are going to do it, as blacksqr says, you should get a premium for it.
At a minimum, any repurchase should be conditioned on the company closing a significant investment round. You can enter into an agreement now where you bind yourself to sell back a percentage of shares subject to that condition. That way the investor, if they care, knows that you will be divesting of a significant percentage of your shares. At the same time, you don't unnecessarily sell back your shares before an investor insists on it (Note: The investor's money is going to end up being used for the share repurchase. So, if they don't actually care, they probably will not agree to fund the repurchase).
It can get a little complicated, in that there are tax implications for you, as well as a potentially detrimental impact on the company's 409A valuation. With some creative lawyering, there could be a win-win here.
There is no standard definition of "founder" or "co-founder." They could offer you half of what they are getting and refer to you as a "founder." I assume that wouldn't solve your concerns.
I'd put the title aside and think about what you are actually looking for from this experience. It goes without saying that you should be getting a very significant piece of equity if they expect you to work for free. You are taking a huge risk. But I get the impression there is something else about the "founder" designation that is meaningful to you. What is it?
But you can solve your concerns without varying the equity division. The company you form only owns the IP you create if your agreement with the company says so. You could agree that, for example, the IP you develop only gets assigned to the company if certain business milestones are met. Or, conversely, you can immediately assign the IP, but have a right to buy it back for a nominal amount if certain milestones are not met by your co-founder.