(in which case, why replace)
11,652 karma · joined June 7, 2014
(in which case, why replace)
A particularly good deal is the Banana Pi BPI-RV2: It has 4xC908@1.25GHz, 512MB DDR3, M.2, miniPCIe, 1x 2.5GbE, 5xGbE.
There is a cheaper Banana Pi BPI-CanMV-K230D-Zero. 2xC908, 128MB LPDDR4, KPU, MIPI CSI/DSI, Wi-Fi, 40x GPIO.
If serious about RISC-V, then of course RVA23 is desirable. Unfortunately any SBC with that is currently expensive due to the RAM shortage situation.
Next best thing? The mature reverse-engineered families nextpnr[0] supports.
0. https://github.com/YosysHQ/nextpnrhttps://github.com/YosysHQ...
The only way forward is a better system architecture, as enabled by the seL4[0] microkernel.
Any solution involving keeping Linux or the monolithic kernel is just stopgap or outright delusional.
I will always choose the vendors that do things properly, when they're even an option.
The proponents of Contracts can then polish their proposal and try again.
The proliferation of BSD licenses dilutes the meaning of "bsd license". There's only one MIT license, so there's no confusion.
("NC" creative commons)
And the disclaimer of liability is kind of important.
Why even bother with the extra "protection". It can be re-made by AI as easily.
Just go all the way, MIT or BSD. Maximize reusability and adoption.
Just entering a code later in a ticket machine was enough to get it printed.
Apparently they saved no money and went homeless in a matter of months (?!).
People who work in mcdonalds putting the fries in the bag do not earn 500k/yr and somehow manage to avoid homelessness.
It is quite telling that they blame the AI rather than themselves.
None of this can ever affect seL4[0] nor a system built on it, due to its architecture.
>Of course, you’d want to try ../… Yes, it does let you escape the temporary folder...
This is absolute bull on seL4 by construction. "sandboxes" that prevent access that the OS otherwise grants. In seL4, this component would not need a sandbox in the first place, because it would never have a capability to some VFS path it doesn't need to access.
This sort of escape relies on ambient security, which is the security model of UNIX and Windows NT. Access is granted by default and then restricted, rather than simply not granted. A broken security model.
And, unlike a demonstrated shitty browser sandbox, seL4 formally guarantees isolation. Capabilities cannot be forged.
*on some CPUs. There's a WIP time fence specification in RISC-V to try and improve this.