2,452 karma · joined February 27, 2009
That tells us that the latter (for their intended use) is a superior design.
And then the ability to enforce a formalized layer between crates and the way that they assemble into your application (i.e. the public API) is powerful for comprehension and maintainability. I go as far as documenting each crate with its own README that presents it as a standalone component with usage instructions, much like an open source library, even if it's only ever used in a single system.
Because even if you're doing this in-memory replacement, the content still lives in they system's memory. So, it makes it less obvious to leak a credential, but it certainly doesn't prevent it.
I fully expect that we will see increased performance from smaller architectures (to a point) simply because they are refined using larger ones.
> The problem is if we can pack a Fable in Qwen 4 27B who will pay subscription prices?
This is available to everyone developing these systems. Prices per relative unit of intelligence will continue to decrease. And market economics will continue to drive the cost down.
Personally, with side projects and tooling, go nuts. There's no reason to read all of that code.
Perhaps if there is any ambiguity, it's intentional on the part of caution around intellectual property provenance.
Starlink, the commercial product, was always off limits for military operations (the type that require connectivity at 100+ MPH).
So, no, this is not one person dictating the usage.
Starlink’s Acceptable Use Policy explicitly prohibits:
- Remotely controlling or piloting any aerial drone or unmanned vehicle (unless otherwise contractually permitted by SpaceX).
- Engaging in any military activity other than approved morale/welfare/recreation programs for service members.
It traditionally involves investing incredible amounts of time and effort and intelligence, but what I think AI does most encouragingly is allows people to access more complex, more modern, more high-performance technologies and interact with them in the same creative and explorational way.
Over the weekend, I was curious about the state of open source touch-based HID support as it compares to the state of proprietary market leaders. I tasked an agent with decompiling and analyzing firmware blobs from the systems I was interested in, and now I have an early alpha version of the most robust source-available multi touch implementation.
There are obviously some legal and perhaps even ethical considerations worth reviewing before considering publishing anything like this, but we have reached the point that proprietary software is essentially open source.
The justice.gov article doesn't specifically say it was an OpenAI account, but I think, based on the fact that they have logs including MAC address of the device, that we could probably assume that. The alternative is that other chatbot account providers are collaborating.
Regardless, doing a string search on a MAC address for a device you find inside your property doesn't strike me as an abuse of the data that is also your property.
There's so much intricacy and subtlety in each organization and even individuals' environment being incorporated into tooling that expecting these tools to generalize at this point is perhaps an expired ethos.
I even see this in the tooling that I run in my own personal stack. Many projects are candidates for sharing, and I have nothing against it, but they incorporate such specificity toward my own environment, including things like hardware, that creating shareable and more generalizable projects from them adds more to the maintenance surface than I would care to support.
But I will still stand behind the fact that this is not a solved problem and that our systems are not as hardened as we say they are. Any news coming out around computer security currently and over at least the next 6-18 months will back that up.
OK gimme an ssh key into your box then.
> L7 DPI firewall policy.
It's a start, but now you're just pushing the fallibility up into extensive policy writing. You have to fully audit and trust every endpoint that's been granted access. And if an endpoint contains a vulnerability which allows RCE, then you haven't secured anything at all.
These are relatively brand new systems that process an incredible amount of data to form their "world view". The word non-deterministic gets thrown around a lot, but you have to understand that there's absolutely nothing deterministic about these architectures. The only way to know that certain qualities could emerge is to observe the qualities emerging.
Giving an agent instructions that, for example, instruct it to only perform GET requests, and then observing that the agent does not always respect that request, is not a failure of security or configuration: it's data being gathered.
Yeah, we're going to become more diligent about the protections that we put in place beyond any level of protection that we've ever employed before. You can say that we have decades of security research and experience, but we're watching all of that fall more and more day by day, finally putting a real delta on how secure we thought we were versus how secure we actually are [1]. Additionally, adversaries have never existed inside of the systems that we hoped to secure in the first place.
So go ahead, enumerate all of the ways in which you think that you can lock down these systems, but do realize that nobody has actually solved this problem adequately yet.
No GPU support is a hard sell for people who latch onto buzzwords and media narratives without actually understanding technology. CPUs are not going anywhere.