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timmyc123

24 karma · joined March 24, 2021

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timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
This is one of the core use cases for why FIDO Cross-Device Authentication was created. To be able to use a passkey to sign in on a shared device, a device you don't control, or a device where you just need temporary access to something.
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
> it’s discouraged

Why do you say that? There are billions of synced passkeys being used by users with some of the largest sites and services in the world.

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
Not exactly. For example, the default credential manager on Android is Google Password Manager, which works on Windows, macOS, iOS, and Ubuntu. There are also dozens of other third party choices.
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
I used the technical name for the capability, but you've likely run into it before.

If there is no passkey on the local device, a QR code will appear which you can scan with your phone or tablet, and use the passkey for the account from that device. It just kind of happens, typically without the user having to do anything special.

I will say though, corporate devices can be a bit of a wildcard as they are usually configured and locked down for a specific purpose. But the cross-device flow is generally not blocked by organizations.

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
Unclear how this quoted comment relates to what I was replying to (which was about exporting / backing up your credentials).

But I'll respond.

> Will I always be able to use any credential manager of my choice? Any naturally also includes software that I might have written myself. And would you be in support of an ecosystem where RPs might block my implementation based on my AAGUID?

If a website were to block your custom software's AAGUID for some reason, you can change your AAGUID.

AAGUIDs in the consumer passkey ecosystem are used to name your credential manager in account settings so you remember where you saved your passkey.

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
You're quoting the first post of a long discussion, where the importance of protecting your data on disk was highlighted, and a proposal was made that at minimum, the default should be encrypting the backup with a user selected secret or key.

> But I want to use Apple Passwords.

You're choosing to use an app that doesn't meet your needs, when there are numerous apps out there that do meet your needs. I'm not sure how anyone is supposed to solve that for you.

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
I can certainly see the confusion. Thanks for highlighting it!
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
Passwords is the name of the app on your Mac.
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
> The passkey vendors state that the goal was to make phishing not just difficult but impossible. This means plaintext access to your credentials is forbidden forever, regardless of your level of expertise, and regardless of the complexity of the process to export/import them.

Care to cite this statement?

> As an Apple Mac user, what annoys me the most is that the use of passkeys in Safari requires iCloud Keychain, which of course requires iCloud and an Apple Account. You can't do local-only passkeys, not even if you take responsibility for backing up your own Mac.

You can use any credential manager you choose. You don't have to use Apple Passwords / iCloud Keychain.

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
Google Password Manager, Bitwarden, 1Password among many others.
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
Your credential manager provides this sync and backup capability. There are dozens of credential managers available that work on all platforms. You don't have to use the default one on any given platform.

Bitwarden is my personal choice.

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
Hi! I'm the commenter on that post that keeps being brought up!

I don't think requiring an encrypted backup (with a key or secret that YOU control) by default is "preventing users from being able to export their own private keys".

timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
when you create or use a passkey, the UI on all platforms tells you where it is going to be saved or where it is coming from.
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
This is not correct. The default credential manager on all devices except for Windows, creates synced passkeys. And Windows will be changing soon.
timmyc123··on Yep, Passkeys Still Have Problems
This is one of the core use cases for why FIDO Cross-Device Authentication was created. To be able to use a passkey to sign in on a shared device, a device you don't control, or a device where you just need temporary access to something.
timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
I'd say:

1) That would be a whole lot of work, collusion, etc for a very limited scope and outcome, which makes it incredibly unlikely to happen in practice. 2) If a credential manager decides to do shady things that you don't like, you can change your credential manager. That's the beauty of an open ecosystem. 3) There are much easier ways to track users online...(unfortunately)

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
> Until we have full E2E passkey implementations that are completely untethered from the major players, where you can do passkey auth with 3 raspberry pi's networked together and no broader internet connection

This is already possible today. And since it's a completely open ecosystem, you can even build your own credential manager if you choose!

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
Just because an API or protocol has a certain capability, does not mean it is implemented for all use cases.

Folks seem to be hung up on the term "attestation" being in the response of a create call. If you look inside that object, there is another carve out for optional authenticator attestation, which is not used for consumer use cases.

I will keep repeating what I've said in the other comments. There is no credential manager attestation in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. Period.

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
Ecosystems are made up of hundreds of thousands of organizations, billions of devices,and billions of users.

How do you expect a single person to be able to make an authoritative statement like that?

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
You should really re-read the entire discussion. It wasn't about passkeys being able to be exported. It was specifically about clear text export.

> The fact that that possibility exists,

The possibility does not exist in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. The post is from a year and a half ago.

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
Bitwarden is a great option for you. You can even self host it!
timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
Since you keep posting this link, I'll just keep saying it: there is no credential manager attestation in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. Period. There is no way to build and allowlist, by design. The consumer synced passkey ecosystem is open.
timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
> You can't do any of that with passkeys.

Device-bound passkeys which are used in workforce / enterprise scenarios are typically attested.

Attestation does not exist for consumer synced passkeys by design. It is an open ecosystem.

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
There is no credential manager attestation in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. Period.
timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
> Passkeys will be the way to go if we get them to remove the "attestation object" field from the protocol.

I don't think you understand the protocol. The attestation object does not mean there is an authenticator attestation.

There is no authenticator / credential manager attestation in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. Period.

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
> I am waiting for the era when using passkeys is not depending from some big tech company.

You can choose any credential manager you want to store your passkeys.

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
> The issue at hand is the requirement for client attestation while using passkeys.

There is no attestation in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. Period.

timmyc123··on Emailing a one-time code is worse than passwords
Hi, since you mentioned me, that's not what was said and putting it in quotes as if I did is really inappropriate.

I'll post the same response I replied to other on a different thread:

Wild that you (and a few others) continue to make these accusations about me in these comments (and in other venues).

1) I've been one of the most vocal proponents of synced passkeys never being attested to ensure users can use the credential manager of their choice

2) What makes you think I have any say or control over the hundreds of millions of websites and services in the world?

3) There is no known synced passkey credential manager that attests passkeys.

tl;dr attestation does not exist in the consumer synced passkey ecosystem. Period.

timmyc123··on Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager
> Please note that there are 2 types of passkeys

This is not really correct. Non-resident keys are not passkeys.

The two types of passkeys are synced and device-bound. Synced passkeys are typically stored in software-based credential managers, while device-bound passkeys are typically stored in hardware security keys or hardware-based credential managers.

timmyc123··on Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager
how do you figure? It is a completely open ecosystem. You can choose whichever credential manager you want.
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