Passkeys in Google Password Manager are not attested. There is no known synced passkey credential manager that creates attested passkeys.
24 karma · joined March 24, 2021
Passkeys in Google Password Manager are not attested. There is no known synced passkey credential manager that creates attested passkeys.
You can choose any credential manager you like, including those like Bitwarden who give you full control of your data.
Wild that you (and a few others) continue to make these accusations about me in these comments (and in other venues).
1) I've been one of the most vocal proponents of synced passkeys never being attested to ensure users can use the credential manager of their choice
2) What makes you think I have any say or control over the hundreds of millions of websites and services in the world?
Enough with this bullshit.
You can also use a combination of Related Origin Requests[1], Conditional Create, and Signal API to allow the passkey for the old site to be used on your new site, automatically create a new passkey for the new domain, and optionally tell the user's credential manager that the old passkey is no longer valid.
There is no shared secret. A passkey is a public/private key pair.
https://passkeys.dev/docs/reference/terms/#synced-passkey
https://passkeys.dev/docs/reference/terms/#device-bound-pass...
Passkeys aren't a standard or protocol. A passkey is the name of a type of credential that can be used via the WebAuthn API, an open industry standard for phishing-resistant authentication on the web platform.
>> "This and the attestation talk that I've seen around providers risks damaging Passkey adoption for years to come"
Passkey adoption is currently growing exponentially. Faster than we could have ever imagined when we started this work 3 years ago. New ideas will help adoption with organizations that have certain regulatory requirements for strong authentication (e.g. banks and lenders).
>> "This Github issue drops the nugget that enterprise members of FIDO are now pushing for provider attestation, which would have massive implications for Passkey as an Open standard"
Many of the highly regulated relying parties that need attestation aren't even members of the FIDO Alliance. Attestation is already supported (and has been since day 1) for any WebAuthn credential and is widely deployed by many authenticators. WebAuthn is an open standard. The challenge is that the current attestation model needs some updating to work with synced passkey authenticators. Previous iterations of this technology used credentials which were device-bound (now called device-bound passkeys).
>> "Genuinely, I am so hungry for even just a crumb of information about portability,"
I think you will be very happy with the content of the session from today then.
>> "The Github issue ends with "I will send you a dm/email""
My goal with that is to bring that feedback into the WebAuthn spec work, which happens in public.
There was a public Authenticate Conference session today that talked about the status of the credential migration specification drafts.
I believe it was recorded: https://authenticatecon.com/event/authenticate-virtual-summi...
I also use 'Secure Agent' which generates the private key in the hardware secure element with unlocking via biometric (with fallback to password). https://secure-agent.lapanthere.com/