This is a reasonable goal for artists to pursue, because it's one that only really depends on them, and they are unlikely to be successful by any other measure without it.
2,541 karma · joined June 17, 2014
This is a reasonable goal for artists to pursue, because it's one that only really depends on them, and they are unlikely to be successful by any other measure without it.
He treated high costs as damage and routed his career around them.
This lesson is as true in business as it is in art: always look for cheaper, more efficient, yet still effective alternatives. Productivity is output/input, and when the output (commercial success, in his case) is a very noisy function of many factors you don't control, figuring out how to minimize input costs while keeping P(success) as high as possible is the key to making good choices. He showed creativity and pragmatism as well as dedication.
Also: failure is always an option (I say this as someone who has failed more often than he has succeeded in his major life goals, although the successes have been more than worth the effort.) Hard work and talent are necessary but not sufficient conditions for success. Maybe there is no audience for the kind of art you love (I'm a formal poet, and have more-or-less made my peace with this.) So make sure you're doing it for love, not money. If the money is there, you've won the lottery, but regardless of that aspect of it, making the art you love, and putting in the hours and deliberate practice to get better at your craft, is worth it.
Could you please clarify how the Crash of '29 caused hyperinflation in Germany in the early 1920's?
Or do you mean the August 1919 to December 1920 slide? That doesn't suffer from violations of the law of causality, but nor is there any evidence that it caused the Weimar government to print ever increasing amounts of money in higher and higher denominations, which started in June 1921, six months after Wall Street had started to recover.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperinflation_in_the_Weimar_R...
Germany and everyone else who foolishly loaned Greece money in 2010--and before--wants to get paid. There is nothing wrong with that. Dredging up the irrelevant past? Not so much.
Or: if I owe someone money, it doesn't matter if they are a nice person or not. I still owe them money, and must suffer the legal consequences if I fail to pay. This is what the rule of law is all about. It protects everyone, even people who are not nice. Even people who are hyopcrites. Even people who are Germans.
This moralization is childish. By all means dismiss the German government's moralization as silly and irrelevant. But don't engage in far more silly and far less relevant moral hectoring of your own.
Sounds like a valuable opportunity to practice Bayesian reasoning. One thing I like to do in situations like this is see if I can figure out any data that contradict my emotional response, so I can build a data-driven case that makes what seems to be emotionally right as implausible as possible.
If you're a Bayesian, you've got to go with what is most plausible according to the data. Your emotions are data about you, which may be really relevant in some cases, but probably not in the case of international trade...
For physicists the math becomes a language and a safety net and a set of heuristics that let us simply the problem to the point of being about to reason about it effectively. A great deal of what we use math for amounts to book-keeping. The human imagination is as capable of dreaming up impossibilities as it is incapable of dreaming up the way the universe actually is, and math helps us avoid doing the former while we use systematic observation, controlled experiment and Bayesian inference to figure out the latter.
Because "thinking about the mathematical representation of physical reality" is such a profoundly unnatural, unintuitive act, and because the math is so strict and simple, it is very hard to for us to use it to imagine impossibilities, whereas if you have a conversation with a layperson you will find they almost instantly run off the rails into nonsense because they don't have the math to keep them on track. So laypeople believe in perpetual motion machines and the like with surprising ease, because they "just make sense" to their intuition (which maps pretty well to Aristotle's physics).
Utility is ordinal not out of some deep desire on the part of economists to "appear scientific" but because it reflects a simple empirical fact about humans. "Utility" is a measure of value to someone, and human values are ordinal: I value my children more than my cats, and no number of cats will ever equal the value of my children. It would be incoherent and wrong to say I value my children ten times more than my cats, and no cardinal relationship between them could possibly represent reality.
This is not mysterious or esoteric. The ordinality of human values is what makes rational choice under uncertainty such a difficult problem, because we can't compute expected values from ordinals (unless there happens to be a market in the things we value, in which case we can get cardinality through prices... but there is no market in children or many other things we value.)
By making it sound like economist's interest in publicly testing ideas by systematic observation, controlled experiment and Bayesian inference--which is what the discipline of science actually is--is some kind of inexplicable fetish instead of a perfectly reasonable goal for anyone who wants to say anything meaningful or interesting about the world, the author does everyone a great disservice.
Furthermore, the traditional paper would have to make a lot of guesses about the kinds of images people were likely interested in and the range of characteristics that mattered. What kind of noise spectrum due your images have, how does increasing contrast affect things, what about the spacial frequency distribution in the images themselves, and so on... Different fields have radically different "typical" images and the attempts at covering a reasonable range of the in traditional papers were not necessarily very limited.
Instead, I see this model of publication as exploiting the possibilities of the 'Net to allow more effective communication and collaboration. And it is publication: it is making public, which is what makes the difference between science and alchemy... if there had been a "Proceedings of the Alchemical Society" we'd have had chemistry a thousand years ago.
What this model of publication does not (yet) have is a reputation mechanism, but it isn't clear it needs one, because you can see the results (and the code) for yourself. As such, I think the author has not only done something interesting in the image compression space, they are pointing the way on the future of scientific publication.
Measuring this model as if it could be described as a certain amount of progress along a line toward the old endpoint is mistaken. This is a paradigm shift, and the models are incommensurable.
This may contribute to the lack of women in software development: women tend not to be quite as stupid as men with regard to probability, and recognize that a profession where they are obsolete at 40 is not a good bet. Most of us won't make enough to retire on before 40, so only an idiot would go into the business if that really is what we face as we age.
"Software development: it's not a career, it's a lottery ticket!"
Why exactly is this? And why would anyone go into a profession where they will be unable to find work when they are half way through, and at the peak of their powers? In every other intellectual enterprise--doctors and lawyers particularly--they hit their peak earning years just as software developers because (supposedly) unemployable.
This makes little to no sense. It isn't like good older developers become magically incapable of learning new langauges or frameworks. It isn't as if they become less reliable than a 20-something just out of school. It isn't as if they suddenly forget 25 years of history that lets them make more accurate effort estimates than anyone else.
So where does this perception that developers must be young come from, and why does anyone go into a profession that by definition (apparently) is going to require the to change feilds mid-career?
The important thing about extra-galactic dark matter is there is too much of it to be made of ordinary particles: protons and neutrons and electrons. We know how many ordinary nucleons there are because we have a pretty reasonable estimate of the primoridal ratio of hydrogen to helium. As the Big Bang cooled quarks eventually cooled down enough to make protons and neutrons. Free neutrons only live about fifteen minutes so they only had a short time to capture onto protons and make deuterium nuclei which could further colide to make helium. The ratio of He/H in the early universe is therefore a sensitive measure of the denisty of the universe at the time of nucleon condensation, and we know the radius from the temperature, so we can calculate the total number of particles. There aren't enough to make up extra-galactic dark matter. There are enough to make up galactic dark matter, so there may be two totally unrelated dark matter problems.
When physicists talk about "dark matter" we are sliding back and forth between meanings according to context, but this is all lost on outsiders, unfortunately. It's needlessly confusing, but unfortunately it's the way it is.
So amongst the perfectly ordinary, non-magical properties that extra-galactic dark matter has to have is to be something other then ordinary neutrons and protons. There are some other contraints on its various interaction strengths that come from the scale of galaxy formation and larger scale structures in the universe too. Again, these are perfectly ordinary properties, inferred based on the evidence in exactly the same way the properties of aether and neutrinos were.
Dark matter may or may not exist (neutrinos do, aether does not) but there is absolutely nothing out of the ordinary about it. It is just normal science doing what science normally does.
Calling them kludges is to mistake the basic process of science for a hack.
There are any number of confirmatory observations that fit the dark matter model, just as there were any number of confirmatory observations that fit the neutrio model. It's just that we haven't observed any dark matter particle interactions directly, just as we hadn't observed any neutrino interactions directly before Reines' experiment.
It may be that dark matter turns out not to exist, and then we will know it was wrong. Until then it is perfectly ordinary science working in perfectly ordinary ways as it has been for over a century.
This is a phenomenon I've seen many times in my work as a consultant translating academic discoveries to commercial code. This work invovles digging through both published papers and actual code to find that some grad student has implemented a clever heuristic that is not described in the paper because it is "inessential" that is what the claimed performance actually relies on.
The article says, "It's unrealistic to think contract labs or university core facilities can get the same results as a highly specialized team of academic researchers, they say."
I can understand this sentiment: science is hard, and at the cutting edge it's really hard. I've certainly got results that I think it would be hard for others to achieve and I've succeed with experiments where others have failed simply because I have good hands.
I once took over an experiment that had been worked on by a heavy smoker with shaky hands. He had developed a complicated apparatus for streching ultra-thin plastic foils over a frame. I just used my fingers. If I had published the way I did it and someone like him had tried to reproduce it, they would have failed.
However... the kind of reproducibilty being talked about here is not (primarily) technique, it is results. If a result can't be reproduced because the cell line was so very special or whatever, then it likely isn't robust enough to be very interesting in practical biology. It certainly isn't of much interest in drug discovery. So while the science may be OK, results that are incredibly hard to reproduce are of very low value for biotech, and that knowledge is worth something in and of itself.
Translation: Amazon suffered almost 100% knowledge loss on the systems your team were the exclusive owners of. The cost of this kind of thing is staggering and yet I've seen companies discount it again and again, over decades. It's insane.
And as to your current gig: run. You'll never be able to grow a decent team with an idiot in charge, and you've got an idiot in charge. Get out, if you can. Nothing but good teams build good products, and if you can't hire a good team because you've got an idiot with a veto you'll be stuck building mediocre (at best) products.
It's a pity there is no actual demand for quality software developers. If there was, this kind of nonsense would be abraded away by market forces with incredible speed. The fact that it persists demonstrates that hardly anyone really cares whether they get good developers or not.
For example: http://www.amazon.com/Anxious-Pleasures-Sexual-Amazonian-Peo...
And historically in the West, marriage as a sacrement didn't get off the ground until the late Middle Ages: the Council of Verona in 1184 if memory serves. And even long after that it was still mostly a practical matter for most people.
Huh? Sterile people have always been permitted to marry. Always. Everywhere. Under all circumstances. Ever. Sometimes inability to bear children has been grounds for divorce or--in the case of royalty--annulment, but there has never anywhere been a test for non-sterility prior to marriage. So what does "the creation of children" have to do with "traditional marriage", given "traditional marriage" could and did trivially take place between sterile individuals.
And whose tradition? One man, one woman, the man's concubines, the odd houseslave, and perhaps a sheep or two? Is that the traditional marriage you're talking about? It's by far the most common kind over most of the world before industrial capitalism.
"Why just two people?" is of course trivially easily answered: humans are a socially pair-bonded species. This seems to be basic to our biology, and is the case in every society ever observed. While bonds between more individuals are possible, they are rare and complicated (the modern poly community is small, for example, and most frequently consists of multi-pair-bonded networks).
And let's be clear about this: you have claimed lithium "will destroy the kidneys, eventually leading to death". This is the claim you made, not some other unrelated claim, and it is wildly implausible.
A plausible but completely unrelated claim is, as reported in this paper: "lithium can be safely prescribed over a protracted period of time, even in elderly populations, but should be monitored closely under specialist supervision, to ensure early identification and management of adverse effects."
This proposition offers no support whatsoever to the claim that lithium "will destroy the kidneys, eventually leading to death". It is not evidence for it, it is contradictory to it.
I'm over-emphasizing this because I've too often seen people make wildly implausible claims like the one you have made and then try to claim that some totally unrelated but plausible claim like the one in this paper somehow supports their position. It does not. Your position is not in any way supported by a paper that directly contradicts it.
Using Bayes' rule consistently will make you aware of how uncertain the inputs are, and that is a feature, not a bug.
One of the most important consequences of this is noted by the article: "Confirmation and falsification are not fundamentally different, as Popper argued, but both just special cases of Bayes’ Theorem." There is no certainty, even in the case of falsification, because there are always alternatives. For example, superluminal neutrinos didn't prove special relativity false, although they did provide some evidence. But the alternative hypothesis that the researchers had made a mistake turned out to be much more plausible.
Bayesian reasoning--which is plausibly the only way of reasoning that will keep our beliefs consistent with the evidence--cannot produce certainty. A certain belief is one that has a plausibility of exactly 1 or 0, and those are only asymptotically approachable applying Bayes' rule. Such beliefs would be immune from any further evidence for or against them, no matter how certain it was, essentially because Bayesian updating is multiplicative and anything times zero is still zero.
There is a name for beliefs of this kind, which to a Bayesian are the most fundamental kind of error: faith.
Example: I developed a little state-machine framework for managing complexity in a large, legacy code-base. It allowed me to refactor a lot of ad hoc distributed logic into the transition table and clean up a lot of weird corner cases that made the code fragile and difficult to change.
Questions might include: "Why did you write your own rather than use an existing state machine framework like the one in boost?" (for C++ frameworks there's pretty much always one in boost, so even if you don't know anything about the area you can throw this in for fun and see what they say). Also: "Why a state machine rather than some other approach to refactoring?" And so on. This process gets at taste and good judgement, it gives you a sense of how tolerant of alternatives they are, and so on.
Additional edit: one of the things I look for in answers is people who say, "Yeah, that particular decision might have been a mistake... I always wondered what would have happened if instead I had..." Good developers are able to admit that not everything they do is perfect, and are willing to give alternative views a bit of credence.
I think "take-home" style tests are the only reasonable way to evaluate this kind of technical competency. They are the closest to realistic. Throw people a small problem of the kind they'll actually be asked to work on. Let 'em deal with it--including documenting their solution!
This. I've been job-hunting lately and getting asked to do "technical challenges" and such like, which are useless to me because they are entirely asymmetric. They tell me nothing about the company except they are following the latest fad in candidate screening.
I pointed out in feedback to one of the testing companies a while back that they had no empirical basis for believing their evaluations didn't reject more qualified candidates for less qualified ones in terms of ability to do the actual job, I got a reply saying, "No, we have all kinds of empirical data! Our clients save $TIME in the hiring process!"
Which is great until you realize that perfectly competent engineers are being locked out of the hiring process by this nonsense. We saw a fad for this kind of testing in the mid-90's, just as the dot-com boom was starting to roll, and it didn't end well. The few companies I interviewed at that used coding tests of one kind or another all failed quickly, although it did give me the opportunity to ask an incompetent hiring manager at one of them how I'd managed to get a PhD in physics while having "below average mathematical abilities" according to one of their tests (which I swear had been written by an innumerate.)
HR people will simply assert that anyone who fails these kinds of tests is incompetent, and anyone who complains about it is just expressing sour grapes at their own failure, but that all side-steps the issue that there is no significant empirical validation on the quality of hires that such tests produce.
Their only real use from my point of view is that if the "interview" process is heavy on "coding challenges" and the like, I'm a lot less likely to bother with going through it, because it speaks to a company that has bought into policies that have no empirical basis and that provide the least amount of information to job seekers, and I'm not all that interested in working in the kind of monocultures such processes produce.
For senior people my favoured interview form is to mostly talk about a few obscure language features in their language of choice, and then have a free-form discussion about language design. Senior people who are any good care about languages, and have thought about languages, and can have nuanced, intelligent discussions about languages and the trade-offs involved. It acts as a good foundation for talking about other kinds of design issues as well. For junior people, some basic test of coding competency may be useful, but over the intermediate level they are very likely testing for the wrong thing, and either way we have no evidence.
Anyone who makes decisions based on the prospective value of options is a sucker. They are a nice bonus when they work out.
You're right that options in a reasonably well-established company can have some value, but such companies can also afford to pay a decent salary, and should.
I am quite happy saying, "Climate change is a plausibly serious problem and the current best solution is to build nuclear (fission) power plants today to replace base load coal, to shift from income taxes to carbon taxes and tarifs immediately, to build solar power and storage immediately, and to phase in regulations that will make it essentially impossible for new thermal coal development. We should also have public subsidies for nuclear and solar to ensure rapid deployment."
When I say that I fequently get called a climate change denier, because that is a label used primarily (not exclusively) by people whose primary goal is smashing global capitalism, and who find climate change a useful stick to beat their political enemies with.
People who continually beat on extrema (like Denialists who claim that cold weather on the East Coast last winter is somehow proof that AGW isn't happening) are adding noise to the argument, not signal. The physically meaningful number is the heat content of the Earth/ocean system, and there's quite a bit of evidence it is rising, and that a significant portion of that rise is due to human activity.
Anti-intellectual neo-populism has set its sights on those changes for almost 200 years, and today the enemies of the Enlightenment can be found across the political spectrum, from the post-modern Left to the populist (and equally post-modern) Right.
As such, the division of history into a period we identify as "the Enlightenment" is a useful tool for wrapping up a bundle of related ideas. Sure, we could say we are defending Bayesian decision making against non-Bayesians and anti-Bayesians, but that would be an anachronistic term to apply to Kant or Adam Smith. So keeping the idea of the Enlightenment alive, while recognizing it as the embryo of the Bayesian revolution, is the optimal course.
The key point is that the correlation function between pairs of zeros of the Reimann zeta function is the same as the pair correlation function of a random Hermitian operator (I presume this means the pair correlation function of the Eignenvalues of a random Hermitian operator).
This is what the OP is getting at when it talks about the distribution of energy levels of heavy nuclei, which are described by the Eigenvalues of a (more-or-less) random Hermitian operator because they contain enough particles that we can start doing statistical physics with them rather than worrying about each individual nucleon.
So this whole thing is less about some deep connection between quantum mechanics and primes than it is about a connection between primes and some of the mathematical machinery that quantum mechanics happens to use to describe the world in a particular approximation where the number of strongly-interacting particles is fairly large.
Physicists know a ridiculous amount of stuff about Hermitian matrices, which are a generalization of real symmetric matrices that have real Eigenvalues (this condition is important because it means the Eigenvalues can describe the outcome of experiments, which always come as real numbers.) So it is no surprise that a physicist of Dyson's stature would know something about these matrices that a mathematician might not.