16,839 karma · joined September 9, 2013
(There's also the surprising efficacy of vocally complaining in public. Do not underestimate a private firm's willingness to recuperate damages on its brand image.)
Whether or not it's possible to set up markets that self-correct is a different matter. They already do to various degrees even in current hampered regimes, modulo business cycles. Though, we must extend the same skepticism towards state attempts at equilibration if we are to be consistent. But far too much doubt becomes an analytical nihilism.
You have not established the slightest bit of an operational definition, and resort to pathologizing neutral transmission channels as hosts of "Evil". This is a complete non-starter and not worthwhile to deliberate. "Evil uses Tor" is as useful as "Evil uses paper".
Evil is agnostic of location. Your question is of no significance. You might as well be perturbed over "Evil" people living in houses or eating food. Unsurprisingly, evil people are people and will tend towards the same activities people generally engage in.
It's not broad. It's that most people conflate various discrete ideas.
I personally believe a lot the current political situation was caused by a total lack of these endogenous corrective forces.
You're right, and my position is that much of this is because of exogenous interference. For example, people like to talk about the post-WWII "Golden Age of Capitalism" that involved Keynesian stimulus policies to one degree or another (though there were exceptions, like Eisenhower's response to the 1958 recession). What people often conveniently omit is that the Federal Register was only a seventh the size of what it is today: https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2015/05/Federal-Regi...
For this, I'm going with Mark Blyth's response to a similar statement about modern economic thought.
You seem to think I subscribe to rational expectations or something. No, it's a basic public choice and regime uncertainty point. If anything, Blyth's comment is overly myopic and his complete dismissal of "time inconsistencies" is unjustified. The Cantillon effects of monetary policy alone are well-acknowledged across the political spectrum, and that's a straightforward example of temporal disequilibrium.
EDIT: Another contradiction is the Greenspan put.
The trick is creating an arrangement such that people can settle grievances endogenously. An exogenous body can't determine social utility since its actions change the expectations of its constituents, perhaps creating perverse incentives. It has also no way of determining what constitutes a welfare gain or welfare loss. Actually the rather special role of the state in being the arbiter of law makes it rather biased towards generating welfare losses via cronyism.
You're also using "public good" incorrectly. You mean "social utility", I think. But social utility is not quantifiable for the simple reason that it's not possible to perform interpersonal comparison of utility.
For the record, you can simultaneously be laissez-faire and an environmentalist. See the Property and Environment Research Center: http://www.perc.org/
It's indeed a lazy article.
By all means, planning was inefficient. You had chronic surpluses and shortages. The attempt to replace profits and losses with "socialist competition" resulted in a disincentive to create surpluses, because it would quickly be integrated as a benchmark in the next Five Year Plan. This then resulted in the phenomenon of shturmovshchina where laborers would mostly idle and then expend massive crunches of labor during the final quarters.
The first seven years of Soviet rule were marked by massive hyperinflation. Wages were determined on a purely piece-rate basis, leading to workers toiling and factory managers manipulating quotas for greater wage returns. Attempted reforms under Khrushchev based on bonuses then only encouraged more homogeneity of production and made wage rates more volatile.
The reason Soviet planners could even calculate in a system of purely vertical transfers of resources was because of the establishment of the Comecon in 1949, piggybacking on Western price indexes. Kosygin introduced a reform in 1965 allowing some measure of profitability and sales, resulting in some growth but no movement in aggregate productivity because of the underlying Five Year Plan incentives. More radical reforms involving decentralization and minimization of bureaucracy in 1973 and 1979 were both rejected.
The Brezhnev era was marked by a large stagnation. Couple that with oil shocks affecting the key USSR exports, perestroika opening up the flood gates and the failed coup in 1991, the USSR was doomed to its failure.
It had nothing to do with Ronald Reagan or anyone "ending communism". It ended itself.
The Soviet system was a disaster and I can't imagine how anyone could say otherwise.
I realize this is tongue-in-cheek, but never forget: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_to_moderation
One could say that the modern world is largely a result of continuous middle-ground reforms that have built up into in an unfathomable and pathological state. Some radicalism might indeed be in order.
Pretty much every debate on economic policy between the left and right is full of fallacies emanating from this episode in history.
Four days into 2016 and we already have a contender for most unintentionally self-contradictory statement of the year.
Considering that communism requires the simultaneous abolition of the state, money/credit in favor of pure production-for-use and all class distinctions, it is dubious whether this can even be done at all, and certainly most countries are in no position to come close.
I'm not entirely convinced by the paragraph on rent control. The author is resting on the assumption that new housing construction post facto overcomes regulatory hurdles, but it seems to me a broader picture of regime uncertainty and adaptive expectations might still skew the allocation of resources, and this discount be reflected in the rent being "too damn high". Actually, he mentions the market-clearing quantity, but seems to gloss over that a modern mixed economy has many forces countervailing from markets ever clearing.
The dichotomy of housing as capital/investment good v. housing as consumer good is interesting, but again, I'm unconvinced of how one function excludes the other, unless there is something countervailing the process of speculation.
I'm sensing a Georgist vibe from this whole thing, but the author stops short of advocating a land value tax. There's some issues with qualifying what an "unimproved" value of land would be, and also on the valid uses of a resource being idle. I'm unfamiliar with the housing trends in countries that implement LVTs, but they're worth researching.
Firstly, when you speculate on something like Candy Crush Saga, you're really speculating on what the brand and assets can yield you in terms of the rent gained from its unit services stretching out through the future. The risk is high, yet so is the anticipation of high yield. It might seem so stupid and trivial when seen superficially (it's "just" Candy Crush Saga), but what a brand like that can mean in a modern economy is surprisingly far-going.
Human labor is different because you can't reliably account for an individual productive laborer being there over some prolonged period of time without turnover. Otherwise, you'd be a slave owner, essentially. So, ceteris paribus, some estimate of a worker's marginal value product (marginal physical productivity discounted by the rate of interest) has to be made, which in a real-world economy is of course difficult and never really converging. This provides ample opportunity for bargaining.
Of course, this is all a ceteris paribus condition. State policies, institutional factors and unionization all severely complicate things.
Such shameless and misguided populism. Ostensibly, "Wall Street" are an evil cabal and not at all subservient to incentives granted by the state? Interesting. You could certainly critique the financial sector on basis of Hyman Minsky or even on basis of credit-driven boom-bust cycles, but this simplistic narrative of deregulation is insulting.
What actually happens is wealthy people like Paul Graham fund startups because they think these things are valuable. Through venture funding, rich people legitimate startups. Thus, they confer value upon the startup.
No shit. Value is subjective. Or perhaps you're still stuck in the political economy of Ricardo, I take it?
We, as a people, determine what is and is not of value mostly through what we believe to be legitimate and worthy of significance. And in late capitalism, we have all basically agreed to allow the market to dictate what is and is not of legitimate value. (This is what social critics recognize as Neoliberalism.)
But what the market deems valuable is not necessarily aligned with what is ultimately good for us as a society or even what we want. Because under conditions of extreme inequality, the market is biased towards people who have lots of money, at the expense of virtually everyone else.
What does this person think "the market" is? Some being existing independently of humans? Markets consist of exchanges, valuations and schedules of human participants, constrained by the institutional framework of governance in a particular jurisdiction.
That's not what "neoliberalism" is, either. Neoliberalism has two different meanings in the field of international relations, and in political economy. Neither of them have to do with the fallacious reasoning expressed above.
And just what, pray tell, is this mystical "social utility," some objectively measurable quantity of what is "good for society"? Demagogues always love to speak of it, and almost always it is a coded phrase for making humans subservient to whatever state policies they envision. There might be "social utility" in some theoretical metaphysical sense. In practice, one cannot do interpersonal comparisons of utility, hence the famous "utility monster" paradox illustrated by Nozick. Thus to speak of any greater societal good without taking into account that every individual has preferences that they reveal, is a folly.
Now, the question of money. What is money? It can be many things, most notably a medium of exchange. But it's also an accounting device for settling debt obligations and coordinating exchanges through time. One of the key insights of the mutualists and later heterodox monetary reformers like E.C. Riegel is that there is no reason for the latter accounting function to be monopolized by a state. Having groups of people issue their own debt instruments to intertemporally coordinate their consumption and production on coarse-grained collective levels, perhaps through a mutual credit bank, would be a great boon on many. This is not the fault of capitalism that it's so rare. It is the monetary monopoly of the state doing this. It is an unrelated issue.
That is not the future I want so I really have no choice but to insist that we resist and come to terms with the fact that the Market we call god is a sick and twisted god, indeed.
The market is not our god. Not even close.
People like Paul Graham need to write essays like this so you don’t question how undemocratic a market system is under conditions of extreme wealth inequality.
"Undemocratic". Another baseless buzzword. The market is not undemocratic. Its democracy operates on a more fine-grained level, and moreover for market participants to form a collective body of action to pool resources (like a corporation) requires unanimous approval on part of these people. A state only needs a thin majority (if at all).
Interesting you single out 1953. There was a recession the very same year! Not a lot of data on it (some JSTOR papers I can't access), but restrictive credit policies, massive military Keynesianism and housing supply shortages are listed as causing factors. Go figure. Then, of course, another much more severe recession hit the Eisenhower period again (but nowadays mostly forgotten) in 1958. Unemployment soared to 7% nationwide and in particular places like Detroit up to 20%. It's difficult to tell how it was alleviated, but this wealth advisor's [1] retrospective analysis claim a highly modest and fiscally conservative response (no great deficits). Wikipedia also cites a 2011 book "Eiseinhower and the Cold War Economy" which claims that some deregulation of mortgage loans helped in the recovery.
So, I can't immediately tell if a "locked-down economy" was the cause of the boom, or if it happened in spite of it. The post-WWII boom began as early as 1946, so I'm uncertain.
[1] http://bradleyandco.blogspot.com/2009/02/as-bad-as-1958-rece...
The most extreme proposals I've seen in America are a federal job guarantee and a permanent incomes policy similar to the Nixon wage and price controls of the early 70s. Post-Keynesians and MMT proponents are very enthusiastic about them, and they reject the idea of the basic income FWIW.