2,583 karma · joined October 2, 2018
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/vngzs; my proof: https://keybase.io/vngzs/sigs/JW88RqiRCJqnuZ_59waFsjWNKkHQ8c9ejTJR4JXX_mE ]
Comments are my opinion and not intended to represent the viewpoint of my employer (past or present).
It's unfortunate, because there is some real innovation around the per-application usage permissions:
> 1Password will ask for your consent before an SSH client can use your SSH key. Because of this, there's no concept of adding or removing keys like with the OpenSSH agent.
If an organization wishes to solve the SSH pubkey distribution problem (the main reason one would copy a private key across machines), then they should use SSH certificate authorities like [1]. In fact, I think that would be a far more interesting 1Password product—HashiCorp Vault could use some competition for this kind of use-case.
[0]: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/40061
[1]: https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/secrets/ssh/signed-ssh-cert...
Johns Hopkins University reports covid-19 has 278.89 deaths per 100,000 - a 1.2% mortality rate in the US [1].
That would put covid-19 at 278.89/16.3 = ~17 times more deadly than the flu. Just because the numbers don't hold for a particular age group doesn't make the aggregate statement false. In fact, it would be misleading to categorize "17 times more deadly" as anything other than "more deadly."
Edit: I made a mistake dividing the percentages the first go around, reporting covid-19 as 73 times more deadly than influenza. I have updated the 3rd paragraph to show the calculations directly.
> The company said the impact from privacy changes by Apple Inc (AAPL.O) remained modest. Last year, Apple began requiring apps to receive permission from iOS users to track their activity on apps and websites owned by other companies.
> The Apple changes could impact Twitter in the future as it grows its performance advertising business, Segal said, referring to ads that seek to drive sales or other consumer actions. He said Twitter is working to mitigate future negative impacts from Apple's changes.
I would be willing to bet that production efficiencies will be found that will eventually drive that cost down significantly.
> Anyone relying on LIDAR is doomed. Doomed. Expensive sensors that are unnecessary. It’s like having a whole bunch of expensive appendices... you’ll see.
[0]: https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/24/18512580/elon-musk-tesla-...
1. A disclaimer at the beginning of the video will instruct people to consult their physician and provide a warning that the views expressed are "against the current consensus of experts."
2. When a controversial expert is interviewed, the following videos will feature experts who hold the mainstream viewpoint, serving to counterbalance the claims of a small minority.
Time will tell if this happens, but I find the above points far more meaningful than any apology.
If the contents of the boot partition are unsigned there are probably easier attacks available. You could, for instance, deploy a kernel with crafted reencryption logic baked in over the default boot kernel. That wouldn't require this vulnerability, because the victim will be typing the passphrase into the attacker's (unprotected) kernel from /boot.
Yes, drivers must still pay attention in self-driving cars. Probably a future exists where that is no longer necessary, but that's not today.
I am not a lawyer, just a hardcore open-source advocate in a former life.
Now, if you're just using a bastion as a jump host, you don't need to offer shells on it. Just allow people to proxy a port to behind the bastion and be done with it.
PermitTTY no
ForceCommand /usr/sbin/nologin
AllowTcpForwarding yes
AllowAgentForwarding no> The count median diameter (CMD) of the cough aerosol particles was fairly similar for all subjects and did not vary significantly during and after illness (p = 0.9340). When the subjects had influenza, the CMDs of all the cough aerosols were between 0.57 and 0.71 μm (average 0.63 μm, SD 0.05), and the geometric standard deviations (GSD) were between 1.54 and 1.83. After the subjects had recovered, the cough aerosol CMDs ranged from 0.57 to 0.89 μm (average 0.63 μm, SD 0.100), and the GSDs were between 1.53 and 2.28. Similar results were seen for the volume median diameters (VMD); the average cough aerosol VMD while ill was 2.44 μm (SD 1.17) and was 2.24 μm (SD 1.50) after recovery. The GSDs ranged from 1.66 to 2.31 while ill and 1.54 to 2.21 after recovery. The difference in VMD while ill and after recovery also was not statistically significant (p = 0.7780).
It is notable that the particle sizes did not differ significantly when the patient was infected with a virus versus the control group. This makes me think that covid-19 is similar.
Not doing any of these steps can lead to infections. Simply issuing N95s to a general population might not help, if the population is improperly trained.
Surgical masks "work" by preventing the wearer from spreading diseases to others. In aggregate, this can help a population, but in specific cases it might not protect you. N95s work by protecting the wearer, with only secondary benefits to others (the N95s with "nozzles" on the mask surface provide no protection to other parties, as outflow is unfiltered).
> It’s important to note that this change — which will be applied during 2022’s tax year and moving forward — applies only to payments received for sales of goods and services, and not to friends and family payments.
[0]: https://finance.yahoo.com/news/tax-law-sell-more-600-1548205...
It's likely that for your security camera footage to be accessed you would have to be targeted. It's likely that such targeting would only affect footage in the future or very recent past. But I'd grant that pervasive attackers can probably capture exponentially-decaying single video frames from millions of cameras if they were appropriately motivated, and those single frames could go back quite far.
The real problem here is the existence of such a system creates a kind of panopticon [0], with chilling effects not only on activity and discussion contrarian to the current administration, but also any future administration that may have access to electronic surveillance records. Without knowing how long records are kept, it is quite plausible that a future authoritarian state will misuse past records to target civilians.
Not all users of anonymity services are people who have a choice in the matter. And if you're not currently a victim of stalking or identity theft, why invite attacks by openly sharing personal information? It's a personal risk calculus, and everyone's needs are different.
- 622 million leaked email addresses, employers, geographic locations, job titles, names, phone numbers, & social media profiles from PDL [0]. According to the PDL website, the purpose of this data was for PDL clients to "supercharge [their] software with over 3 billion profiles. Tap into the resume, contact, social, and demographic information for over 3 billion unique individuals, delivered to you at the scale you need it."
- 125 million leaked email addresses and 9 billion data points on users from Apollo [1]. Dataset includes email addresses, employers, geographic locations, job titles, names, phone numbers, salutations, & social media profiles.
[0]: https://www.troyhunt.com/data-enrichment-people-data-labs-an...
[2] https://www.wired.com/story/apollo-breach-linkedin-salesforc...
In Whoogle's case, Google can still track the searches you send to it. With Startpage, only Startpage can track them in detail - and Google only in aggregate.
Concurrency problems don't magically disappear because your language can check for them. You still need to use memory-safe patterns, but the compiler will force your hand and prevent you from doing unsafe things accidentally.
In the end, this makes it far easier to build correct, concurrent applications. If you decide to try some fancy new pattern that doesn't require locking, the compiler can guarantee the memory safety of your new implementation.
If your passwords are the only part of your password manager you think are secret, then you're probably not considering the utility of an enumeration of all your network handles. Mine aren't very interesting, but I wouldn't post that on GitHub, even in a private repo.
I love pass and use it. But when I need to carry my password database around, I don't rely on pass alone - I throw the pass database in a Veracrypt container. That way if my flash drive is stolen, it's just an encrypted blob.
In Bitcoin wallets, for instance, multi-signature wallets do not allow rotation of the signing keys. If one of your singing keys gets owned, you need to burn the wallet.
First, every operating system you'll use - likely in your lifetime - is a giant mountain of C code. From the kernel all the way to the userspace utilities. As a programmer, your career will be forged on the shoulders of giants, and those giants wrote in C. So to understand how your machine works, you must learn C.
Second, K&R covers far more than just a language - it presents a system of thinking about computing. It covers algorithms for line counting, memory allocation, and the construction of linked lists. The techniques you learn for pointer manipulation will enable you to author implementations of data structures that are considerably more elegant and simple than the naive methods [2].
It contains fundamental, influential insights about the computer science field on nearly every page.
Still, I'd discourage you from writing C professionally if you can help it. Rust retains nearly all the advantages of C while abandoning its unsafe memory model and replacing it with compile-time determined allocations and de-allocations. As roughly 70% of CVEs in C or C++ projects are caused by memory unsafety, this is a significant feature [1]. But the insights you make in studying K&R will translate to everything you build, regardless of language.
You'll walk away with a mental model for computers so powerful that it was the genesis of our modern technology era.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_C_Programming_Language
[1]: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safet...
[2]: https://grisha.org/blog/2013/04/02/linus-on-understanding-po...
In addition to sandboxed tabs, reasonably secure defaults, and robust content blocking built-in, it also offers some interesting features like user-agent randomization, tab masking, and URL tracking depersonalization.
I'm completely unaffiliated with Snowhaze, just sharing a recent discovery with HN.
[0]: https://web.archive.org/web/20210827144742/https://blog.then... (site's down so archive.org it is)