1,902 karma · joined September 5, 2012
Any responsible bug bounty researcher reviewing the DNS zone by hand would spot the CNAME and remove it from the target list. You don't get to wash your hands of that because your chatbot did it.
> IP address certificates allow server operators to authenticate TLS connections to IP addresses rather than domain names. Let’s Encrypt supports both IPv4 and IPv6. IP address certificates must be short-lived certificates, a decision we made because IP addresses are more transient than domain names, so validating more frequently is important.
https://letsencrypt.org/2026/01/15/6day-and-ip-general-avail...
> Next, by changing its /etc/hosts file, which declares mappings from hostnames to IP addresses, the agent can point the fake hostname at the real Power BI dashboard, and fool the security proxy
Did a chatbot design this "sandbox"?
No comment is offered on if I have ever gotten a bug noticed this way.
To summarize, in my experience there is immense value to having basic shell tools available in the environment where you need them with zero extra friction. Stripping those out provides a security benefit only in specific nebulous and niche scenarios.
For the rare cases where you find yourself needing to attach a debugger to your pods running in staging/prod, a debug container is absolutely the right tool to reach for.
And even that's only true if you assume kubernetes is the only place your container runs where you might want to also debug it.
The actual attack surface of your application? Or the attack surface of you and your team's attention from a busybody security org.
It's important not to confuse the two.
What's the benefit really, though? If you still need to be able to rapidly deploy a new image in response to a dependency CVE, what have you gained?
In theory it has a couple of benefits. You don't have to re-deploy your image to patch CVE's in OS components if you don't have any OS components. And it provides some measure of defence-in-depth - one could certainly theory-craft a scenario where an attacker gains some limited control over your application and then uses some OS component to escalate.
These days if a security engineer is proposing my team adopt distro-less containers to receive these benefits, I would point out that we need to weigh them against the very real drawbacks of not having standard debugging tools available where and when we need them. And also to consider the relative impact of other defence-in-depth measures they could be pursuing instead - such as any sort of network policy to limit network traffic.
And yet none have offered to volunteer their time to maintain a downstream fork or otherwise rectify the perceived problem.
Strange.
(Hot take: If you're not using --dangerously-skip-permissions, you don't have enough confidence in your sandbox and you probably shouldn't be using a coding agent in that environment)
On the other hand, how much virtualization are you really going to be doing with 8GB of RAM?