Interesting. This suggests you're storing all passwords in plain, is that true?
1,013 karma · joined September 5, 2012
Interesting. This suggests you're storing all passwords in plain, is that true?
I indeed only cover DH at #2, as index-calculus does not apply to ECDH.
If they were serious about using their $200k for their security they should have either: a) Hired an actual independent cryptographer to do an audit. b) Set up a bug bounty program that rewards any weakness found, not just this "all-or-nothing" contest they have now.
Namely, if you look at the keylength.com values for asymmetric key sizes, 768 in 2009 ago should come close to the difficulty of 896 today. The RSA 768 challenge was broken in 2009 (http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/006), which cost them "the equivalent of almost 2000 years of computing on a single core 2.2GHz AMD Opteron". Renting that amount of time Amazon EC2's $0.06/hour instances would be $1 million.
For $200k one could probably brute-force an 896-bit RSA key. ;)
I'm sure Google has a valid legitimate use of this data somewhere, but why it ends up in end-user XMPP clients is a mystery to me. If Google's aim is to avoid enterprise networks messing with the message, then Google should document somewhere how to verify the signature.
Whether Google stores your message when you turn on "Off-the-Record" is of course something we can never know. But if your contact says you said "X", and you say you never said "X", Google could still prove you said "X" at some point. That does not fit the idea of "Off-the-Record".
Unless you have a client which will happily disable a cipher and try again when encountering an error. But if you do that, you don't deserve any security.
I don't have a specific concern with AES128 (compared to the concern I have about the usage of (EXP-)DES and RC4). It merely surprised me that some clients prefer AES128 over AES256 and I think it's important for server operators to know that there are clients that will stop working when disabling all <256 bit ciphers.
Personally I don't find speed a concern when using IM, it's not full-disk encryption or a large download where speed is noticable.
I like the ssllabs test and I hope this sort of testing gets more common for TLS usage that isn't HTTPS. However, I think a B is still cause for concern. You can only obtain a B if you have a) SSLv2 enabled (which is broken), b) cipher suites enabled with <128 bit symmetric keys, c) a RSA private key with less than 1024 bits or d) if you don't mitigate BEAST. I think only d) is a valid excuse under some circumstances.
On the other hand, a 1024 bit RSA key with SSLv3 and only RC4 will give you an A, but I would not call this very secure anymore.
"Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."
I'd rather have some smart people take a thorough look at the curves we use before we make ECDHE mandatory. If we need to choose between computationally heavy DHE or possibly backdoored ECDHE, I'm afraid many companies will still pick ECHDE.
[1] - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-rema...
If it's a self-signed certificate scrubbed from anything identifiable then a server could still try to correlate what website you visited by the public key from the certificate.
If they want to look up any real person, they'll still be able to find all their email/IM accounts. If you include a way for the recipient of an email to tell "fake" messages from real ones, then the NSA will be able to tell as well.
If they can extract everyone's email messages from fiber-optic cables in real-time, then they surely are smart enough to create a filter that ignores just a list of words without any actual structure, like "Croatian nuclear FBI colonel plutonium Ortega Waco, Texas Panama CIA DES jihad fissionable quiche terrorist World Trade Center".
There's really no reason to only allow CA signed client certs.
Sure, you need to rely on Tor, but aside from that anybody could set up their own server easily (no hassle with DNS and SSL certs).
I would like to see an automatic way to use GPG to sign OTR keys, though. You can create a message "My OTR fingerprint is abcdef..." and sign that, but it would be nice if clients did that automatically. Or maybe even use the GPG key itself instead of the OTR key...