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xnyhps

1,013 karma · joined September 5, 2012

[ my public key: https://keybase.io/xnyhps; my proof: https://keybase.io/xnyhps/sigs/m-nsALHMR_0WYxhEtG6-ngXnDELyL0_4cxRt_ufsGkM ]
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xnyhps··on IRC Networks Under Systematic Attack From Governments
> so we've had a solution to the credential sniffing for 10+ years: our services support AUTH via something very similar to CRAM-MD5.

Interesting. This suggests you're storing all passwords in plain, is that true?

xnyhps··on Misconceptions About Forward Secrecy
My claim is: FS does not imply, by definition, that every attack scales linearly in the amount of keys. Having a counter-example of an attack that does scale linearly does not disprove that point.

I indeed only cover DH at #2, as index-calculus does not apply to ECDH.

xnyhps··on Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest
I think it's a brilliant move from the people behind Telegram: all cryptographers will now keep the vulnerabilities they find to themselves until March 1st. This saves them from a lot of bad press now, and probably doesn't cost them anything.

If they were serious about using their $200k for their security they should have either: a) Hired an actual independent cryptographer to do an audit. b) Set up a bug bounty program that rewards any weakness found, not just this "all-or-nothing" contest they have now.

xnyhps··on A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Developers
I really don't know how well the required operations execute on a GPU. I've only skimmed the RSA 768 paper to find that line.
xnyhps··on A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Developers
Yeah, when I started actually trying to back it up, I noticed I was probably a factor 5 off.

Namely, if you look at the keylength.com values for asymmetric key sizes, 768 in 2009 ago should come close to the difficulty of 896 today. The RSA 768 challenge was broken in 2009 (http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/006), which cost them "the equivalent of almost 2000 years of computing on a single core 2.2GHz AMD Opteron". Renting that amount of time Amazon EC2's $0.06/hour instances would be $1 million.

xnyhps··on A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Developers
Well, not entirely the same framing.

For $200k one could probably brute-force an 896-bit RSA key. ;)

xnyhps··on Telegram - secure, free messaging
Even WA doesn't roll their own key deriviation scheme, they use PBKDF2+SHA1.
xnyhps··on Is Google signing your chat messages?
It is possible this is to stop misrouted messages, however, they didn't add it in response to the recent problems. There are some Google hits from 2007-2008 where the field was present, for example https://developer.pidgin.im/ticket/3360#comment:15. Before ~2009-2010 the field seems to have been 8 hex encoded bytes (half a MD5 hash?), after that they switched to the base64 format.
xnyhps··on Is Google signing your chat messages?
That doesn't refer to any intent on Google's side.
xnyhps··on Is Google signing your chat messages?
Where do I claim Google is doing it intentionally to help government intrusion? The paragraph about law enforcement is only meant as an example of how signing can be used against you. The point there is that it doesn't even need to be Google's intention and requires no direct assistance from them.

I'm sure Google has a valid legitimate use of this data somewhere, but why it ends up in end-user XMPP clients is a mystery to me. If Google's aim is to avoid enterprise networks messing with the message, then Google should document somewhere how to verify the signature.

xnyhps··on Is Google signing your chat messages?
That makes sense if there is a dispute between you and Google. But if the dispute is between you and one of your contacts instead, to claim that the signature is forged would be to claim that your contact has Google's cooperation. That bar might not be as high as claiming your private key was compromised, but it is still quite high.
xnyhps··on Is Google signing your chat messages?
There's a difference between Google "knowing" you sent a message and third parties being able to verify that you sent a specific message.

Whether Google stores your message when you turn on "Off-the-Record" is of course something we can never know. But if your contact says you said "X", and you say you never said "X", Google could still prove you said "X" at some point. That does not fit the idea of "Off-the-Record".

xnyhps··on Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
Eh, no. Maybe in SSLv2, but the first thing TLS encrypts is a hash of the entire handshake. Modifying the cipher list would change those hashes into something different.

Unless you have a client which will happily disable a cipher and try again when encountering an error. But if you do that, you don't deserve any security.

xnyhps··on Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5 in late 2010
Do you want to make the gamble that every server has "honor cipher order" on and configured in a saner way?
xnyhps··on The State of TLS on XMPP
The key schedule weakness in AES256 that I know of only applies to related-keys, which don't affect TLS as far as I know. If there's anything else I'm missing, I would like to know.

I don't have a specific concern with AES128 (compared to the concern I have about the usage of (EXP-)DES and RC4). It merely surprised me that some clients prefer AES128 over AES256 and I think it's important for server operators to know that there are clients that will stop working when disabling all <256 bit ciphers.

Personally I don't find speed a concern when using IM, it's not full-disk encryption or a large download where speed is noticable.

xnyhps··on The State of TLS on XMPP
I clarified that I mean to refer to those with OpenSSL names that start with "ECDH-" and "DH-", which is not the same as what the shorthand "DH" gives you. As far as I can tell, EDH is an older synonym for DHE.

I like the ssllabs test and I hope this sort of testing gets more common for TLS usage that isn't HTTPS. However, I think a B is still cause for concern. You can only obtain a B if you have a) SSLv2 enabled (which is broken), b) cipher suites enabled with <128 bit symmetric keys, c) a RSA private key with less than 1024 bits or d) if you don't mitigate BEAST. I think only d) is a valid excuse under some circumstances.

On the other hand, a 1024 bit RSA key with SSLv3 and only RC4 will give you an A, but I would not call this very secure anymore.

xnyhps··on The State of TLS on XMPP
I wrote this post before the latest of Snowden's revelations and Bruce Schneier's comments on them[1].

"Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."

I'd rather have some smart people take a thorough look at the curves we use before we make ECDHE mandatory. If we need to choose between computationally heavy DHE or possibly backdoored ECDHE, I'm afraid many companies will still pick ECHDE.

[1] - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-rema...

xnyhps··on The First Few Milliseconds of an HTTPS Connection (2009)
Note that certificates are always sent in plain. If it's a CA-signed certificate it will always have a common name or subject alt name field that specifies what host it is for (or a wildcard), readable in plain.

If it's a self-signed certificate scrubbed from anything identifiable then a server could still try to correlate what website you visited by the public key from the certificate.

xnyhps··on Distracting the NSA
How would that help? If the NSA tracks a billion accouns, how is even a million fake ones going to make a difference? I'm pretty sure "spam" is not a new concept to them.

If they want to look up any real person, they'll still be able to find all their email/IM accounts. If you include a way for the recipient of an email to tell "fake" messages from real ones, then the NSA will be able to tell as well.

xnyhps··on Distracting the NSA
I find all of these attempts to "troll" or "distract" the NSA quite naive. If they truly have direct access to the backbone cables of the internet, then they must be pretty good at filtering signal from noise. Just imagine the size of email/IM traffic compared to bittorrent.

If they can extract everyone's email messages from fiber-optic cables in real-time, then they surely are smart enough to create a filter that ignores just a list of words without any actual structure, like "Croatian nuclear FBI colonel plutonium Ortega Waco, Texas Panama CIA DES jihad fissionable quiche terrorist World Trade Center".

xnyhps··on Why is nobody using SSL client certificates?
Most places where you can authenticate with SSL client certs allow you to add your own self-signed certificate and authenticate using that. All the validation you need is to check wether the cert is in the user's list. You can only forge that by stealing the private key.

There's really no reason to only allow CA signed client certs.

xnyhps··on Pirate Bay co-founder aims to launch surveillance-proof messaging app Hemlis
The end goal is to package Tor + this + an XMPP server (Prosody) into plugins for clients. It'd be a federated network running through Tor, but any XMPP-capable client will be able to use it.

Sure, you need to rely on Tor, but aside from that anybody could set up their own server easily (no hassle with DNS and SSL certs).

xnyhps··on Pirate Bay co-founder aims to launch surveillance-proof messaging app Hemlis
I totally agree! I've been working on federating XMPP over hidden services (https://blog.thijsalkema.de/blog/2013/06/11/xmpp-federation-...), but I don't give a setup like that any chance to be possible on iOS.
xnyhps··on Pirate Bay co-founder aims to launch surveillance-proof messaging app Hemlis
I wonder how that can be "surveillance-proof". Even with e2e-encryption any product using central servers can still see who is chatting with whom, who's in your address book and what IP address your phone is connecting from. That's exactly the meta-data Verizon got accused of sharing. They might be of The Pirate Bay-fame and not share this with the NSA voluntarily, but they're not immune to being hacked or infiltrated.
xnyhps··on Off-the-Record Messaging – encrypt your instant messages
GPG for chat (at least XEP-0027) is much, much less secure than OTR. You have no authentication of received messages, no defense against replay attacks or dropped messages, no perfect forward secrecy. In my opinion, support for it should be removed because it endangers people who think it is secure.

I would like to see an automatic way to use GPG to sign OTR keys, though. You can create a message "My OTR fingerprint is abcdef..." and sign that, but it would be nice if clients did that automatically. Or maybe even use the GPG key itself instead of the OTR key...

xnyhps··on Introducing the PiCloud Notebook
It somewhat reminds me of http://www.sagemath.org/.
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