1,200 karma · joined April 1, 2021
I'll probably post a follow up if I get anywhere with this!
EDIT: I am now actually unsure if this is the case. From what I can see, all of the write-ups mention the Cursor marketplace and Open VSX specifically, but make no explicit mention of the official Microsoft registry.
EDIT 2: The version that was compromised (2.1.313) seems to have never been published on the official Microsoft registry. As per the documentation [1], unpublished versions should still be discoverable:
> When you unpublish an extension, the Marketplace preserves the extension statistics. The extension remains publicly discoverable and available via an existing API.
[1]: https://code.visualstudio.com/api/working-with-extensions/pu...
For JS, your machine running untrusted JS code is the intended use case. In this scenario the JS is sandboxed in whatever JS engine (V8 etc) and does not have access to "dangerous" methods, and the main use case for a JIT vuln is to escape this sandbox to execute code on the host. This applies to regular internet browsing (and visiting potentially malicious sites) and also, e.g., using the built-in browser in a locked down device (such as game consoles) to gain arbitrary code execution.
For Python, this security boundary doesn't exist. I can't really think of a scenario where you would be running potentially malicious Python code in CPython that would need a JIT vuln to escape whatever sandbox it is in instead of, say, calling the functions in Python directly (or using the C FFI to do whatever). I'm sure that in some niche use cases, this scenario might exist, but to me, it seems like the potential attack surface is fairly minimal.
EDIT: Also, I'm pretty sure that Python's copy-and-patch JIT writes code to a writable mapping and then mprotects it to W^X? I don't think it leaves RWX pages lying around at all.
Dan Guido, of Trail of Bits, claims they have an "universal" exploit [2]. Knowing their track record, I don't currently have a reason to doubt this claim.
[1]: https://stealmybitcoin.com/
[2]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50226010
EDIT: The HN title has been changed since posting this comment.
Not to say that the technical objections were without merit, they likely very much weren't, and the debugger and instrumentation support and maintenance work sounds fairly painful on its own.
Why is this a given? This service has been around for longer than LLMs have been a thing.
Otherwise, yeah, this seems like a stage-1 loader for fetching and running a payload off the Ethereum mainnet.
I think JXL is a cool image format, but was being held back by the most popular browser not supporting it, limiting its use (in the web especially) by a lot.
They were very fast to patch it. The patch actually removed loadstring (among the other fixes), which broke a bunch of mods for a while. The vulns themselves could also theoretically be abused by malicious mods, which unfortunately seems to be more commonplace these days.
I recently wrote about an RCE exploit in the game Project Zomboid (which uses Lua for mods), which also used loadstring as an initial entry point for the exploit chain, but since the Lua interpreter was fully Java, byte-code memory manipulation shenanigans were out of the question for me and I had to pivot in a more traditional way.
The fact that loadstring can also load straight up bytecode was news to me though, that's interesting to know.
The title "The Linux reality check" made me groan, though. LLMs (Claude?) seem to love this phrase.
IDEs, static linters, and syntax highlighters aren't the cause of a global microchip shortage, immensely increased energy demand, or the destruction of rare works. They have not, at any point, been the cause of effectively DDoS attacks in an effort to slurp up all of the internet's data, or the extensive proliferation of hallucinated content on the internet.
The development of IDEs, static linters, and syntax highlighters has at no point employed low-paid labor from third world countries for data labelling or safety filtering, exposing thousands of people to violent and abusive content for multiple hours a day.
Any of these issues alone would be a reasonable cause for adopting a policy to avoid using such tools. Calling it equivalent to not using IDEs or linters is bizarre to me.
* [1]: https://www.media.mit.edu/publications/your-brain-on-chatgpt...
However, even being in the cybersecurity programme, Fable refuses to answer prompts that it determines could be even tangentially related to cybersecurity. In fact, for a while, I was unable to use Fable with any prompt, as it recalled from memory that I was a cybersecurity professional, which triggered the refusal even for simple prompts like asking for a chili recipe.
> These are asciinema recordings of real terminal sessions, rendered as text rather than video. Playback caps idle pauses at two seconds and changes nothing else.
Thanks? This sounds like it's the LLM's response to the prompter, not something you should display on the page itself...
The combinatorial explosion you're picturing only shows up if you make a separate type per combination of present fields, but you don't need to. An independent optional field stays one `T | null`. You only reach for distinct types when fields are correlated and present together because they represent a state, and then it's a discriminated union on a status field, which is N states, not 2^N.
https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/commit/?h=toggldeskto...
Generally, most modern devices send broadcast/wildcard probes precisely to avoid leaking the PNL. From what I know, directed probes are only sent for hidden APs.
Paths where pedestrians and bikers (and other light transportation vehicles) are mixed are overwhelmingly common.