2,199 karma · joined July 13, 2016
I’d say most countries provide free education to their residents. But, not all.
You’re alluding to wealth taxes, right?
Because taxing unrealised gains are wealth taxes.
Or maybe I’ve misunderstood?
There are valid use cases for TLS middleboxes. Anyone having to secure a networks outbound access to only essential services has run into the “I have to allow all of AWS/GCP/Azure/CloudFlare/…” for some critical tool to work.
Options are:
- Allow all out (nope, not secure)
- Allow all to the cloud providers IP range (still terrible)
- Filter on SNI but don’t inspect the payload (better than no security, and doesn’t require plaintext access).
- Full MITM TLS proxy (performance bottleneck, and now we have plaintext access to all your data, which we really don’t want and didn’t previously require to do the filtering).
- Try convince the third party service to run on a handful of static IPs that aren’t behind a global load balancer with access to the rest of the cloud providers customer domains. (Yeah right)
See: Hospitals. Payment Networks. IoT networks.
It doesn’t say anywhere (from my quick skim) that those unique IDs need to be recorded against/associated with patient records when they are implanted.
Or have I misread?
1. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan
2. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationing_in_the_United_King...
Use the password generator to come up with some random words, different for each question.
Eg based on the specific sites visited, payload sizes potentially, domains looked up, etc you’d be able to characterise the person. Especially so if anything they did was not encrypted, or they have their own vanity domain (for emails or anything else).
> Mullvad only needs to associate each decrypted IP packet against an assertion that the packet was paid for.
The idea of Obscura is by using two middlemen (them + Mullvad) that neither party can figure out who the end user is. So I’m looking at Mullvad from the perspective of: if they were evil, what about this solution are safeguard protecting the end users privacy. And my conclusion is they’d still be able to break the users privacy in the same way as knowing the users IP, just without the IP.
One comment/question about the exit nodes. Can someone correct or validate my thoughts:
It’s a WireGuard tunnel from the user to Mullvad, so while Obscura can’t see the user traffic, couldn’t the Mullvad exit node see the traffic, and using knowledge of the users WireGuard public key, associate all that users traffic with that key? So even if they can’t associate it with an IP, they could still potentially identify and track you.
This assumes they use a customised version of WireGuard to somehow log & associate each decrypted IP packet against the users public key.
If they interviewed everyone at that parade, what they were doing etc, and some of those people were completely uninvolved but maybe having affairs, or doing something immoral (whatever that is), then shouldn’t they be afforded privacy? Eg Imagine one would be mortified to have what sex toy was in their pocket at the time documented in public transcript.
We could still install PEDs with imprecise doors. Ie more doors than required. Larger doors than required. The main thing is for the door to only open while a train is in front of it, and all the train doors be unobstructed.
Ie won’t hurt much to have a PED open to the train wall or opens double the size of the current trains’ door.
None of the above would enable driverless trains. It’d just go towards accident reduction —maybe suicide too, depends on the individual’s determination.
Something like https://www.orvibo.com/mobile/en/product/allone.html
I’ve used it to control window blinds, projectors, projector screens, and even some basic Apple TV commands. Wouldn’t surprise me if it could do the RF used by garage doors too.
Apples share price has taken a bit of a fall this week.