2,394 karma · joined September 8, 2011
There have been other games where this has been problematic (Animal crossing I think limited some features per device instead of per account).
There is a significant segment of the internet that thrives in the gutters between paid services, straight up piracy sites, and actual "dark web" sites that require TOR or other specialized access. The restreamers that live in those gutters are questionable at best, straight up illegal at worst, and fund themselves through fraudulent ads, or legit ads for sketchy or dangerous services and sites.
It is entirely possible to use those sites safely, just like it's also possible to navigate dark alleys in major urban centres in the late hours, but that doesn't make it a low-risk activity.
That said, many, many of the bike and pedestrian paths are adjacent and are only separated by a painted lines, and signs urging pedestrians to stay out of bike lanes :/
Most of the preferences in this will actually reduce the target-able attack surface, and disable some features that could be footguns, but at the same time disable some optimizations that aim to reduce cognitive load on users (which in turns reduces the likelihood that mistakes will be made).
Unless something has changed dramatically, the Firefox team (and other teams) test and fuzz Firefox extensively - obviously default prefs and features will get more coverage.
An actual fork like LibreWolf that adds or removes code and ships a different build fundamentally changes how the software is built and invalidates a significant portion of the security work that has been done by the Firefox security team.
I am not arguing that Librewolf or any of the other forks of Firefox[1] are necessarily worse for security, just that browsers are ridiculously complex pieces of software and making claims about security requires more than just gutting or adding features.
[1] other than Palemoon, because screw those guys; when I challenged them on the security program for Palemoon, their loopy leader tried to harass me and other former Mozilla folks. Given their propensity for instability I wouldn't trust them at all.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/scientists-warn-o...
Just two quick examples, but go ahead and keep your head in the sand.
fiddles pedantically while the world burns
Ok, granted, I spent the last 23 years of my life working in IT security across consulting, government, finance, and tech companies, but this is just garbage. Banks only invest in security to the degree that: - they are legally required to - they have contractual obligations to - that the risk of loss for a specific class of incident exceeds their self-insurance threshold
That's not a hypothetical comment, that is something that was explained to me as an AppSec lead when running into walls trying to get some issues fixed at one of the largest banks in the world. For the record, the issues that I was trying to have remediated would have had to exceeded an annualized loss expectancy for the region I was operating in of 10 million dollars per year to be considered risky.
Your definition of a bank being pretty secure and mine are probably radically different.
> Combination of user & password with enough entropy, and basic brute-force defense that blocks after 3-4 attempts is the industry minimum standard.
Sure, users should choose strong passwords. Banks should also require multi-factor authentication (real 2fa, not the SMS based weaksauce that a bunch use). But, that increases support and transaction costs. So, instead, blame the user! Beyond password selection, there is also the issue of how passwords are hashed, salted, stored, and brokered into a more reliable back-end credential that can be used, absolutely none of which the user has input into or control over, but sure, blame the user.
> User is the weakest link always, you cannot fix the "stupid" user that downloads malware, warez, adult content and gets infected and loses everything.
sigh you really like banging that drum.
> These people need life lesson to learn how to operate technology safely. > Although I agree that online banking could be made more secure, but the threat model will immediately evolve and adapt because scammers/fraudsters are still there and they want to eat.
There is absolutely no way to train average users to operate modern internet technologies safely because the average user has no effective control over the software and hardware they use (yes, Linux is a thing, and so is open source hardware, but users of those OS and hardware are not average users)
The primary reason the incidence of fraud is so high in the finance sector is because business has chosen to optimize for high transaction volume, and has accepted the risks of doing so. Stop trying to blame end users.
Sure. Why not start with an outline for what infosec101 should look like. Include estimates for how long the training should take, what the cadence for testing should be, and which agency should be responsible for validating that training. Do be sure to accurately communicate the degree to which an end user with a chip enabled bank or credit card has the ability to distinguish and disambiguate what constitutes a 'safe' or 'legitimate' online business. Also, include some details about how individuals who have been certified as completing this class and/or licensing scheme should procure insurance to protect themselves in case of an accidental data breach (for example, they leak their card info), and outline the process by which that same licensee can file an insurance claim against the insured party downstream of the physical point of payment or online payment portal that allowed a breach to happen. After all - if we are going to require online safety training, and licensing, then we should create another insurance scheme to facilitate resolution of those claims and resolve the costs.
It is really easy to point the fingers at a customer and say "problem exists between chair and keyboard", but the reality is that in the modern economy, the end user has almost no control over the security of their transactions, and little ability to influence how their purchase is handled beyond the question of "cash or card".
The only incentive that retailers, online stores, payment processors, and financial institutions have to resolve this is the simple fact that they own the liability for this, and it's only through the myth of the idiot user that they have been able to shift that liability, to varying degrees, back to the consumer.
2. That is not the customers fault. Full stop. Yes, some sites are more shady than others, but there is nothing a consumer can do to determine if a service provider will get hacked.
3. Yes. Unfortunately, phishing is really easy. Despite the prevalence of this attack, training users to effectively detect and avoid being a victim is almost impossible.
4. See #3.
5. See #2.
6. How is a customer supposed to validate the security of an ATM against modern skimming technology, many of which are virtually indistinguishable from normal bank machines.
7. Yep, not great. Why don't banks require 2FA? Because it creates friction and increases costs. Better to just externalize the risk.
Your entire blame the user argument is bunk that has been packaged up and recirculated by the finance community for almost 20 years (and I have been using these arguments against them for nearly that long, granted it's close to ~12 years since I worked in infosec at a bank).
All things considered, Nintendo has a bit of a climb to get to those numbers.
It's absolutely important to challenge Mozilla and other open source projects, especially in this era of enshittification[1]; Mozilla and Firefox operate in a position of trust on behalf of their users.
That said, the parent post positioned this as an abomination of a feature, but acknowledged it makes sense as a user feature. The ability to disable add-ons by domain is a great feature for user control, but it's functionally useless on it's own as a mechanism to protect users.
In order for that feature to actually protect users, you need a mechanism to turn it on and off remotely so that if a new threat is identified (or there is a serious regression in Firefox that makes specific extensions higher risk), that users don't need to act to do the right thing.
This isn't a meaningful loss of user control, and I already said elsewhere that Mozilla should have communicated more about this new feature, but ultimately it's the right kind of feature.
So the ability for the web browser to arbitrarily add and remove features from the browser is scary? Just asking because there is a massive security trade-off and the intersection of a number of threat models in this comment.
Do you trust the platform you use to download and execute arbitrary code (that is, web content) to automatically update itself?
If not, how do you balance the lack of automated updates against the need to keep software up to date to prevent exploit of known vulnerabilities?
If so, how do you distinguish the ability to download and execute new code that could remove or suppress the features you choose from the ability to enable and disable add-ons/extensions?
There could have been better communication on this, but describing the feature as scary tells me you don't really understand the threat model around your use of a web browser, and may not be asking the right questions or considering the actual threats.
Yes, the feature can be abused, but frankly, at least Firefox is an open source project, and there are methods that can be used to disable this feature, up to and including using or creating a new Firefox fork.
You said "Real art is deep, meaningful, timeless and doesn't need to be imposed."
Sand Mandalas are deeply meaningful, but completely timeless - most are created to be destroyed, often within days or hours of completion. Brueghel's Flatterers is a relatively crass, surface level, but lasting commentary on what we often refer to as Musk fanboys and such these days :P
Fundamentally, art is human expression, and your attempts to gatekeep that have fallen pretty flat so far.
In practice, planting with a hoe is extremely light work, you turn the earth (or even just make a little hole), plant the seeds, maybe apply some fertilizer, or fresh soil, then close up the hole.
With a plough, you cut a long line, usually with pack animal or mechanical assistance, and then follow and plant seeds along the entire line. This can mean managing a large animal, or operating heavy machinery, or both! Plus there is the issue of removing obstacles (dead trees/plants, rocks, and other debris).
Setting aside the physical requirements for the different planting methods, there is also the issue of the capital cost of farming. https://blog.oup.com/2013/06/agriculture-gender-roles-norms-... is a decent high level article that covers how and why this is thought to contribute to gender roles.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/racial-bias-found...
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessm...
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/10/amazon-hi...
Three easy to find examples. There is no shortage of discussion of these issues, and they are not new. Bias in new technologies has been a long-standing issue, and garbage in, garbage out has been a well understood problem for generations.
LLMs are pretty cool, and will enable a whole new set of tools. AI presents alot of opportunities, but the risks are significant, and I am not overly worried about a skynet or gray goo scenario. Before we worry about those, we need to worry about the bias being built into automated systems that will decide who gets bail, who gets social benefits, which communities get resources allocated, how our family, friends, and communities are targeted by businesses, etc.
We know, we have watched this argument unfold in the United States over the last 100 years. It sure does seem like a few people are using guns to kill a lot of people.
The point of regulating AI should be to explicitly require every single use of AI and machine learning to be clearly labelled so that when people seek remedy for the injustices that are already being perpetrated, that it is clearly understood that the people who chose to use not just ML or AI technology, but those specific models and training criteria can be held accountable if they should be.
Regulation doesn't have to be a ban, or limits on how it can be used, it can simply be a requirement for clearly marked disclosure. It could also include clear regulations for lawful access to the underlying math, training data, and intended use cases, and with financially significant penalties for non-compliance to discourage companies from treating it as a cost of doing business.
Objectively I think I interviewed fairly strongly, however for the hands on coding portion of the interview, I basically couldn't even write more than a few lines. I couldn't remember simple things like function or class definitions. I had to look up a few syntax things, and my already challenging dyslexia was exacerbated to the point where I could barely type.
I recognize looking back on it that I had a freaking concussion and wasn't even supposed to be looking at screens or reading, but it was still really embarrassing.
Whether it's a car accident, an earthquake, or an aggressive oncogene that gets activated by a cosmic ray or cup of diet pop, there are way too many things that will straight up kill us despite our otherwise healthy or privileged lifestyles.
Treating diseases does have an impact on extending the average lifespan, but early health interventions (that is, vaccinations, fewer babies dying from preventable illness or malnutrition, and women's pre- and peri-natal health care) has been far more impactful. Stretching that long-tail out in the future is going to require significant advances in treating and remediating aging and it's related indignities.