> What's the point of disabling the ability to install another OS?
It comes down to the trusted base concept: once the OS is running, it can provide strong assurances to prevent unauthorized code from running but that can't protect against malicious code starting before the OS. An attacker could use the built-in virtualization support on most modern CPUs to load your normal OS and, with care, make it extremely hard to tell that all of your actions are compromised. Some people like that because it could be used to attack DRM schemes but it could also be used to record keystrokes, steal crypto keys, install ransomware which waits for the user to be utterly hosed before triggering the payment prompt, etc.
Having the firmware verify every bit of code before executing it avoids that problem but that poses the problem of having a trusted signing key which needs to be managed – imagine the mess if, say, Dell's key leaked – and poses the problem of getting new keys on the list for legitimate purposes (e.g. booting Linux) but not making it realistic for malware to do the same thing. I'd like to see some sort of government regulation requiring the latter but having some fairly cumbersome process to complicate social engineering attacks (e.g. reboot while holding down a switch, answer a prompt that you understand this will expose all of your personal data to the new OS, etc.).
This is also why Intel is introducing things like SGX - note the selling points on https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx:
> * Remains protected even when the BIOS, VMM, OS, and drivers are compromised, implying that an attacker with full execution control over the platform can be kept at bay
> * Benefits from memory protections that thwart memory bus snooping, memory tampering and “cold boot” attacks on images retained in RAM