Obviously, using government-controlled PKI for communications would be unwise, but there's very little risk to using government PKI for financial transactions as governments already have warrantless access to this data.
Obviously, using government-controlled PKI for communications would be unwise, but there's very little risk to using government PKI for financial transactions as governments already have warrantless access to this data.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity_cards_in_the...
Even if you don't have to show government ID for every financial transaction, you need to show government ID (and, often, a lot more government paperwork) to open a financial account that can be used to make transactions. Your ability to move money is entirely predicated on the banks knowing who you are by linking your accounts to a tombstone government identity document.
Using PKI controlled by government to authenticate identity for transactions doesn't give government any more control over your affairs than it already has. All it does is add one more layer of authentication to the transaction process by allowing all parties involved to verify that their counterparty is the legal entity they claim to be.
Whereas the whole point of a public key system is that nobody needs your private key. So we don't need to provide individuals and businesses with a way to give their private key to somebody else. The only reason you'd give your private key to somebody else is because you want them to seamlessly impersonate you forever, so there's no need to make it any easier than, for example, giving your kidney to somebody else.
Concrete example: A WebAuthn/ U2F "Security Key" offers no way to get the Private Keys out. If you want to "steal" the credentials used to get into my GitHub your best bet is to somehow trick me into physically packaging up the USB authenticator itself and sending that to you by FedEx or something. Or maybe you could try putting a knife to my throat or something?