Except, in this version, there's an actual Chinese speaker, Xin, sitting inside the room. It's clear that it's Xin, not Bob, who understands Chinese.
Now let's move back to the original Chinese room argument. It's clear that it's the room that understands Chinese - or, rather, the whole system composed of the rules (the room) and its executor (the person), but not the executor by itself. It only seems absurd because our real-life experiences make us presume that, when there's a room and a person, the person must be the more sentient part. IMHO the whole argument is a philosophical sleight of hand.
However, when confronted with this "the system does understand" argument, I believe that Searle and his defenders fall back on the lack-of-qualia position. That is, there is no entity that would experience anything, and that therefore the ability to demonstrate "understanding" as the room does isn't a sufficient (or perhaps even necessary) condition of consciousness.
This point is trickier to rebut, because I think it's fair to acknowledge that our ability to imagine where there would be qualia in the case of the chinese room is more than a little limited. I think the only fair answers are either:
1. our imagination is too limited, but that doesn't allow us to conclude that there cannot be qualia
2. there are indeed no qualia associated with the Chinese Room, because consciousness is not required for full language processing.
(or both)
We're seeing with things like GPT3 that an actual powerful language model needs to have a load of real world knowledge built in. But that knowledge is all based on experiences by others. From the way it talks (and generates poetry) you can tell that it is unable to synthesize new experiences. It can't come up with a description (or metaphor) of human experience that it hasn't been taught.
To be a convincing AI, you don't just need to replicate descriptions of experience from memory, but actually have new experiences as well.
Meaning that the Chinese room, in order to be able to demonstrate "understanding", will also require other inputs than just text. Otherwise it can't really understand the world, because it only knows about the world from hear-say.
Searle's claim was that it was clear from his thought experiment that such a system could exist without any understanding, and definitely without consciousness. Others have disagreed with his reasoning and his conclusion.
The fact that one of those two things is impossible (or, alternatively, is equivalent to a device encoding a full understanding of the language) negates the argument.
Sure, but I think that's always the case. When you speak your entire body (at least head/neck/chest, but also cardiovascular system) are involved in "delivering" information but your tongue (and for that matter most organs involved) doesn't "know" the information. We still say that "you" as a person know something.
When a computer displays a result of some (cpu) calculation on the monitor, the gpu making electrical signals for the input of the monitor has no meaningful knowledge about the calculation, etc, but we still say "the computer" made the calculation.