> Signing certificates with your existing keys kind of make the whole point moot.
You mean getting signed certificates from a SSH CA with an existing client public key? Why does it make the whole point moot? The SSO is responsible for verifying your identity. Rather, it seems pointless to generate a new SSH keypair each and everytime you want to get a certificate and login to a machine. You can certainly do it if you want but I don't see the point. You can keep using your existing SSH public keys to get short lived certificates and login to a machine, do you job, logout, and repeat the process with the same keys.
One of the primary benefits of the described setup is that there would only be a single long term key. It would be managed more securely because it won't be lying around on each user's personal machines.
That certificate would only be issued after you've gone through SSO or some other certificate management process and it would have a defined expiry period, maybe even as short as a few minutes. It is a meaningful change.
When using key based authentication, as long as you had your public key in the authorized_keys file on the server, you would be able to login without issues, even if your keypair is compromised. With certificates, even if your keypair is compromised, you wouldn't be able to login to that server because you'd have to compromise the SSO/MFA authentication step as well, which adds another layer of meaningful security in the process.