I think the fundamental issue is that all of the players in the PKI world want to essentially enforce that services must be able to deal with short-lived certificates and certificate revocations. As an example, see the recent HN article where Digicert tried to do mass certificate revocations due to a bug with their certificate issuance, and were then sued by a client (Alegeus) who did not have things set up to deal with revocations quickly, so Digicert postponed the revocation: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41114794 . So basically, the powers that be are trying to say "certificate cycling is part of the process - 'set it and forget it' is a thing of the past."
Now, in your objections, you state "None of the solutions offered address the risk that pinning tries to mitigate, namely that you have a client who trusts a misbehaving/rogue/malicious CA", but CAA with CT monitoring should largely prevent that. With CAA monitoring you state "only ensures that if a malicious actor somehow gets a hold of your domain..." - well, if a malicious actor somehow gets ahold of your domain, you're generally fucked in any case - if they've got control of your domain it's probably not a huge step up to get control of your signing cert.
I think your comment brings up good points to someone like me who's not an expert, but it still feels like the overall point that needs to be addressed is that "certificates should be expected to expire or be revoked at any instant" and certificate pinning breaks that.