922 karma · joined January 5, 2021
Signs are low cap-ex but high op-ex technique that harms overall safety and causes thousands of deaths per year.
But a UBI funded through an LVT is much better than that. An LVT is a non-distortionary tax. This means that increasing the tax does not change behavior. But it is not only non-distortionary, it also reduces the ability to speculate as land tax rises. This causes the LVT to be a net-good tax, in much the same way that not taxing carbon is a subsidy to those who burn carbon. The lack of an LVT is a subsidy to the owner of the land. Ending rent-seeking will thus cause the economy to grow. This would result in deflation, and so the UBI is necessary to bring us back to our inflationary target.
The article shows a good example where this will have a massive impact to the economy, even if it is not true in most of the world. That place is South Korea, where roughly 50% of the population lives in the Seoul Capital Area, which continues to grow every year. This has caused significant economic damage, as young people are unable to afford to have both families and a place to live in Seoul, but they must live there in order to have a job. They can simply not afford to live outside of Seoul, where housing is less, but wages are much less.
If they were to enact an LVT with a UBI(or as Georgists call it, Citizen's Dividend) then the population of Seoul that would prefer to move out into cities and towns throughout SK would finally be able to afford to do so. They would only need to be able to find a job that allowed them to live a lifestyle that they preferred.
That's what great about a policy that does not advocate for any particular out-come, but about reaching equilibrium economic states. For places that have to low density, it incentivizes density. For places that have to high density, it incentives spreading.
Thus there is no single rental price, merely an initial unknown quality rental price, that as a tenant gets to know the quality of the landlord, and the landlord gets to know the tenant, will resolve to a price that is different for every combination. There will be a distribution according to all of these factors.
These are market rents. LVT will not change them.
What we need is a system that subsidizes the value created by the inventor, without any restrictions for the rest of society. Without any restrictions will allow every innovation to maximize the value that it is able to create. Currently an innovation can be hampered because the person who created that innovation is not the one best able to utilize that innovation.
One way to accomplish this is through an Innovation Prize Model while Patents and Copyrights be abolished. The way it would work is that once you've come up with some innovation, you have a choice. You can either keep it secret, or you can reveal the secret. If you reveal the secret, the government could grant you a 30 year bond based on the value of this innovation. The bond will have a minimum value, and if it's discovered within the 30 year window that the innovation is more valuable than previously suspected, value will be added to that bond. You would then have an option, to keep the bond for the 30 years, or you could sell a portion of this bond to others to instantly get cash. There could be a market for these that made it easy to trade and discover expected values.
It's clear from the dead-weight loss portion that overall value will be much higher than the existing scenario, so this payment will be much higher than any profits that copyright holders currently accrue.
If we begin doing this, and as a result, none of the academics can get a job as they are all filled by the 'embedded' students, I don't mind seeing how that shifts everything.
> allow companies to direct the research towards their ends
So long as they hit the requirements to reward the prize, I don't much care what else the students are driven to do. One might ask how does this differ from when a company hires a fresh graduate? In fact, I wouldn't mind also applying this system to those that have degrees, and are trying to advance in their careers.
My only concern is that the students would then be able to be hire-able by other companies in their field. If that answer is mostly yes, the system is working as intended. If it's not, the requirements would be raised until they are.
Instead of getting student loans and going to college for 4 years where you don't accomplish much, companies should directly offer high school students 4 year full paid internships. At the end the student needs to go through a test from an expert in that field, possibly a professor lead examination, and to the degree that they pass the company and student share in a large prize. If they pass that test, they officially get the degree.
You're trying to give individual researchers, who believe they have a chance at a new strategy, to take their new strategy and sell equity to the prize they might win to a new firm.
With a prize based approach, what you want is for researchers to make small targetted gambles early in their career, earn their prize profits from those gambles, and work their way up into bigger gambles. There's nothing crazy about this scheme, it's how businesses have formed for hundreds of years. If a company wants to buy equity in the prizes of an independent researcher, I see no issue with this.
> then why would this model not be possible in a government office
I see no issue with governmental workers, or those from a university medial research center, or any other persons who can achieve the results from receiving this prize.
> someone needs to pay for all of the trials that don't work
The researchers. They are the one taking the risk. They are the one who would get the rewards. Skin in the game.
> With a public funding scheme, the benefit analysis could be based on public health interests.
Yes, we should directly pay the organization, or persons, based on the value they generate from their own. The bigger the public health interest, the more they should be paid. Right now we give a tiny piece to these people, and thus harm our incentives. Fully fund the results. It's risk-free.
Since the people with the money don't understand the science, these possibilities must then be assessed by bureaucrats, and this causes our best to spend half of their time writing proposals instead of working and researching. A complete waste of time. Let the people who know the most about their subject freedom to take risks, and then they are given the spoils of their rewards if they are proven correct.
Prizes are much more efficient than grants. Prizes should be given to academics according to the value they produced. I have no issue if the academics choose to spend some of the windfall profits of their prizes on trials.
This is a much better compromise. The company will end up with more money(and faster!) as a result of this prize than under a patent system - since the patent system induces dead-weight losses, and the government will end up with more lives saved.
Surely some of those groups are going to be filled with selfish red pickers. Should the kind coordinating players still go blue? All the red pickers are going to lie that blue is sensible. I suspect that more coordinators will die in this way than the always blue pickers if every coordinating player went red.
So now the full-world version only has the law of large numbers on their side, but they have no way of knowing just what percentage of the population is a selfish red picker. Going for team blue is the much riskier option that can yield catastrophe.
But this isn't all that related to the productivity dividend. That's more natural by setting banks to have a full reserve requirement. At that point new innovations would yield deflation, which would be harmful. The Fed would then have to step up and be the creator and distributor of new money. That money would then be the UBI, distributed equally to all.
For those that don't know, an LVT causes land prices to drop, where a tax on 100% of the rental value of the land would cause land prices to fall to zero. This would allow landlords who were able to own many more properties, and could use their funds building out extensive retail spaces, and have many tenants pay them rents.
If they were to recreate the site and frame it as a symptom and issue site, which is what the interview described, that would yield many different choices on how to navigate the site, and it would do a lot better. In particular, what happens when two different issues have the same symptom. Right now, that question is closed as a duplicate. Under a symptom and issue site, it's obvious that both should stay as distinct issues.
I'll note here that the work that Nadeo has done on the matchmaking aspect is in line with what I'm thinking and should be expanded throughout the online gaming space. A division 10 COTD player will never see a cheater. If cheaters do show up, as they commonly do in Weekly Shorts leaderboards, the community ignores it. Their region leaderboards do a much better job than typical games of bringing the community together and they promote continuity. When top players smurf COTD on a new name, the community sniffs it out within the hour. TM doesn't need anti-cheat.
The ranking system needs to be a better determinate of skill, especially early in a new accounts life, so that they can stop harming normal players games. This might mean changes to the rules of a game to allow this to be done better. The match-maker should take this into account, so that if a player does go up against a player that was far from the skill level that they end up at, it should protect that account from being placed with new players for a time so that they can forget about it.
For the example you choose for Chess, you might force players to do Chess Puzzles before they can queue for their first match. A normal player would then never see any cheaters.
However, for the vast vast majority of the player-base who is top 50% in skill, the fat normal distribution nearly guarantees that most of the people they play against will never be seen again. And therefore there is no harm for them not to be toxic to them, so most people only ever experience toxicity in online competitive games.
Server browser games solve this because players end up with "home" servers where they come back to over and over, and over time build communities who do the same. This was taken away from the players when we moved to matchmaking, and many in the player-base have a bias against matchmaking because of it.
But this is in no way required, and merely a result of gaming companies to do any work on this front. It would be extremely easy for these games to add an arbitrary community tag to the matchmaker that would attempt to put people in games with players that they have not previously reported. The matchmaker might take a little bit more time, but since these players are in the fat normal distribution, their average matchmaking times will still be incredibly low.
The primary effect of these types of laws is that businesses that employ fast food workers are less profitable, and thus when they compete against other businesses for a given lot, will bid less for the land. If the marginal buyer changes, it would have to do so to a business that relies less on minimum wage fast food workers.
Regardless, instead of arguing over which commercial property takes which spot and trying to engineer the perfect fit with the limitations we are dealing with, we should be increasing the amount of places that are zoned for commerce. This will bring increased demand for labor, which will increase wages.
A better way to be thinking about this is at what point will you stop gaining weight? If you are someone who burns 2000 calorie a day but eats 2170 calories a day, you will be gaining 170 calories on that first day. But then you will add some fat, and you will burn 2001 calories, and only gain 169 calories the next day. Eventually you will reach equilibrium where you burn 2170 calories. But fat isn't like muscle, it's very efficient because that is it's main purpose - it just sits there. So it actually takes a lot to reach that new equilibrium.
The rule of thumb is 100 calories surplus will lead to a long run gain of about 15 pounds. So the 177 calorie average would end up yielding about 25 pounds of fat above what they should have.
Then the next question is if you will ever reach equilibrium, or if when you start burning 2001 calories, you start eating 2171 calories...
> that we can
Highways are designed to be unsafe by design, so without a redesign they require speed limits.