464 karma · joined December 5, 2014
We're hoping that there are also a bunch of other interesting side-effects of enabling the usage of Valgrind for Go, in particular seeing how we can use it to track how the runtime handles memory (hopefully correctly!)
edit: also strong disclaimer that this support is still somewhat experimental. I am not 100% confident we are properly instrumenting everything, and it's likely there are still some errant warnings that don't fully make sense.
You don't control the entirety of your web stack, and your hosting provider, or DNS provider, or someone else, has decided to be 'helpful' (either blindly, or due to some misconfiguration somewhere along the line) and issue a certificate on your behalf, as they are able to intercept CA validation traffic at the DNS, TLS, or HTTP layer.
The draft ACME specification does though.
While Roberto Peon is one of the authors (and a core developer of the preceding SPDY protocol) saying that HTTP/2 is some Google invention is a bit of a punch in the face to the IETF and the two other authors who do not work at Google.
The tech/security community is crazy.
ok
> CVE-2013-4484: Varnish before 3.0.5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (child-process crash and temporary caching outage) via a GET request with trailing whitespace characters and no URI.
:|
https://www.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-December/0064...
>an additional 164 certificates over 76 domains and 2,458 certificates issued for
>domains that were never registered.
:|
I can't speak exactly to why Python was chosen, but it should be noted this isn't intended to be the be-all-end-all in terms of clients. There are already a number of other independent clients that have been developed for various different purposes.
Unfortunately the best candidate, at least for us, for supplying SCT receipts to end-users, via x509v3 extensions in OCSP responses, is currently not fully supported in Golang.
a. if we know of an already existing certificate for the domain that is being authorized you must prove control over both the server and the key used in the existing certificate
b. validation is done over multiple paths to confirm results, an attacker would need to be able to hijack connections from all of our validation servers in order to cause miss-issuance (servers which would move over time)
Currently (a) is mostly implemented but (b) needs quite a bit more work before it can go live.
See https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/pull/97 for a discussion of why this was scraped from the ACME specification proposal.