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iscoelho

684 karma · joined January 18, 2017

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iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
I agree it is a widely used format, however, it is rarely used on iOS devices.
iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
UAF bugs lead to RCE exploit chains.
iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
The vulnerability in question is being severely underestimated. There are many other comments in this thread going into detail. UAF = RCE.
iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
FFMPEG is upset because Google made the exploit public. They preferred that it remained a zero-day until they decided it was a priority.

I don't understand how anyone believes that behavior is acceptable.

iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
It is my understanding that the commenters in FFMPEG's favor believe that Google is doing a disservice by finding these security vulnerabilities, as they require volunteer burden to patch, and that they should either:

1) allow the vulnerabilities to remain undiscovered & unpatched zero-days (stop submitting "slop" CVEs.)

2) supply the patches (which i'm sure the goalpost will move to the maintainers being upset that they have to merge them.)

3) fund the project (including the maintainers who clearly misunderstand the severity of the vulnerabilities and describe them as "slop") (no thank you.)

This entire thread defies logic.

iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
Google is a contributor to FFMPEG.
iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
I am unsure why this untruth is being continuously parroted. It is false.

This is exploitable on a majority of systems as the codec is enabled by default. This is a CVE that is being severely underestimated.

iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
Google is, at no cost to FFMPEG:

1) dedicating compute resources to continuously fuzzing the entire project

2) dedicating engineering resources to validating the results and creating accurate and well-informed bug reports (in this case, a seriously underestimated security issue)

3) additionally for codecs that Google likely does not even internally use or compile, purely for the greater good of FFMPEG's user base

Needless to say, while I agree Google has a penny to spare to fund FFMPEG, and should (although they already contribute), I do not agree with funding this maintainer.

iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
It’s a reproducible use-after-free in a codec that ships by default with most desktop and server distributions. It can be leveraged in an exploit chain to compromise a system.

I'm not a Google fan, but if the maintainers are unable to understand that, I welcome a fork.

iscoelho··on FFmpeg to Google: Fund us or stop sending bugs
It’s a reproducible use-after-free in a codec that ships by default with most desktop and server distributions.

The recent iOS zero-day (CVE-2025-43300) targeted the rarely used DNG image format. How long before this FFMPEG vulnerability is exploited to compromise legacy devices in the wild, I wonder?

I’m not a fan of this grandstanding for arguably questionable funding. (I surely would not fund those who believe these issues are slop.) I’d like to think most contributors already understand the severity and genuinely care about keeping FFMPEG secure.

iscoelho··on Show HN: I reverse engineered macOS to allow custom Lock Screen wallpapers
Hi cindori, I couldn't figure these out without purchasing:

1. Does Backdrop plan to support 5K/6K wallpapers? Those resolutions are pretty standard for Mac workstations.

2. Is functionality similar to TopNotch supported where the notch is hidden? If this was supported I'd likely buy a lifetime license today.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
Yes, DNSSEC is designed to prevent DNS MITM via integrity. BGP hijacks lead to MITM. I am not sure where the confusion is.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
I agree that the problem lies with BGP and we definitely need a solution. You can also say the problem is with TLS CA verification not being built on a solid foundation. Even with that said, solving those problems will take time, and DNSSEC is a valid precaution for today.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
I am focusing on DNS because this thread is about DNSSEC. The topic of doing it in to the TLS servers themselves is a tangent not relevant to this thread.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
How about another incident in 2022? Attackers BGP hijacked a dependency hosting a JS file, generated a rogue TLS certificate, and stole $2 million. Keep in mind: these are incidents we know about, not including incidents that went undetected.

https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2022/03/09/attackers-exploit...

Noteworthy: "Additionally, some BGP attacks can still fool all of a CA’s vantage points. To reduce the impact of BGP attacks, we need security improvements in the routing infrastructure as well. In the short term, deployed routing technologies like the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) could significantly limit the spread of BGP attacks and make them much less likely to be successful. ... In the long run, we need a much more secure underlying routing layer for the Internet."

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
Yes but it is still possible to execute BGP hijacks that capture 100% of traffic, rendering multi-perspective validation useless. RPKI sadly only solves naive "accidental" BGP hijacks, not malicious BGP hijacks. That's a different discussion though.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
> and they just impersonate the server after the DNS step?

Yes, there are different mitigations to prevent BGP hijacking the webserver itself. Preventing a rogue TLS certificate from being issued is the most important factor. CAA DNS records can help a bit with this. DNS itself however is easiest solved by DNSSEC.

There are a lot of mitigations to prevent BGP hijacks that I won't get too much into. None are 100%, but they are good enough to ensure multi-perspective validation refuses to issue a TLS certificate. The problem is that if those same mitigations are not deployed on your DNS servers (or you outsource DNS and they have not deployed these mitigations) it is a weak link.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
> I'm sorry, this is just such an incredibly fine-tuned threat model for me to take it seriously.

You claim it is fine-tuned, but it has happened in the real world. It is actually even better for attackers that it is "obscure", because that means it is harder to detect.

> but assume that the hijacker is only so powerful as being able to impersonate a specific DNS server and not the server that the DNS server tells you about.

Yes, all layers of the stack need to be secure. I am not making assumptions about the other layers - this thread is about DNS.

> if the CA is capable of using any information to detect that this might be a forgery

They are not. The only mitigation is "multi-perspective validation", which only addresses a subset of this attack.

> And of course, the proposed solution doesn't do anything to protect against other kinds of DNS hijacking

Yes, because other kinds of DNS hijacking are solved by HTTPS TLS. If TLS and CAs are broken, nothing is secure.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
Yessir, that isn't possible yet but it would absolutely be a solution! I'd love to see it.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
I would love to go to back to the drawing board and solve the security pitfalls in BGP & DNS. I wish the organizations and committees involved did a better job back then.

Sadly, we live in this reality for now, so we do what we can with what we have. We have DNSSEC.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
DNSSEC is about authentication & integrity. DNSCRYPT/DOH is about privacy. They solve completely different problems and have nothing to do with one another.

There is also no reason we can't have both.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
That’s false. Any organization that enables DNSSEC for their domains gains its security benefits and prevents any potential DNS hijacking.

At this point, your statements border on intentional dishonesty. Please be more truthful and responsible in your statements.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
I hope the facts speak for themselves.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
Happy to see security audits doing good work.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
Yes TLS SNI is ubiquitous. I am referring specifically to TLS SNI metadata collection.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
DoH does not solve anything that DNSSEC solves. They have almost no overlap.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
and Slack.com still uses DNSSEC. They appear to not have come to the same conclusion.
iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
Not saying they are malicious actors, but easy answer would be any Public WiFi anywhere. They all intercept DNS, less than 1% intercept SNI.

It is also public knowledge that certain ISPs (including Xfinity) sniff and log all DNS queries, even to other DNS servers. TLS SNI is less common, although it may be more widespread now, I haven't kept up with the times.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
"at absolutely enormous expense"

Citation? A BGP hijack can be done for less than $100.

"You can't just name call your way to getting this protocol adopted"

I do not care if you adopt this protocol. I care that you accurately inform others of the documented risks of not adopting DNSSEC. There are organizations that can tolerate the risk. There are also organizations that are unaware because they are not accurately informed (due to individuals like yourself), and it is not covered by their security audits. That is unfortunate.

iscoelho··on Why do we need DNSSEC?
I never said "most". I said it happens and is documented.
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