946 karma · joined March 10, 2009
That said, planning a strategy for offsite data storage or a secondary authenticator is of course wise. A safety deposit box or other offsite location that you can frequently refresh and keep up to date would be a good investment. If you’re worried about keeping a master key to your life in a single place, you could separate your data and your authenticator. The how likely depends on your threat model, several people on this site may find it insufficient. To whatever degree you obfuscate or complicate your recovery path, you also increase the risk of losing access to it yourself.
You might also consider it’s not necessarily the “thing you have” that might go MIA, but due to physical injury, age, or just forgetfulness, the “thing you know” could also be at risk. I realize this the older I get. Finding a secure way to store a master password in the event you cannot recall it, or perhaps in the event of your death, is something you may also consider. In this case, I would avoid a cipher or something else you’re likely to forget.
What he seems to have missed in separating truth from prejudices is important to recognize. This is an expected communications problem in a society that struggles with decency, and decency is what’s at issue here - not truth. Because at least one party lacks decency, they’ve lost their credibility to convey any truth. The other party may lack tolerance, but that intolerance is, at least usually, about those prejudices, and not any underlying truth.
Regardless, actual heresy - of the biblical type that Graham is trying to use to support his argument here - has historically been more based on threatening a power structure, such as was the case with Martin Luther, for example. Ironically here, the tables were turned, and the “heretic” (Luther) presented factual information while it was the hearer that reeled with prejudice. The two cases are about as much alike as a camel and a spork. I am surprised he tried to make the comparison. Nonetheless, if that is what he’s trying to argue, then he’s seemingly suggesting the fault is always on the listener for being offended. In the cases Graham is describing though, it is far more likely to be the speaker who wraps whatever truth there might be into vitriol brought into the conversation. It at least would have made for a good essay to point out both possibilities.
Tl;Dr: truth always falls victim to prejudice, on either side, which is why we should work to identify and root out our own prejudices before engaging.
I'm calling BS. This site was disabled repeatedly for exceeding bandwidth today. I find it hard to believe traffic is as usual.
Now, as for the tools, saurik is entirely correct. The PIN code is, for the most part, just a GUI lock - think of it as a screen saver lock. The file system is encrypted on the chip, but applications need to be able to read and write from the file system. If you read the FAQ, I make no secret about how this works: we boot a custom RAM disk (from DFU mode) that mounts the disk. The kernel takes care of the decryption and because we're not actually booting the OS on disk, we don't have any pesky screen saver lock or anything else to even content with, though if we did, the forensic imaging process runs entirely in the background, and has the same level of access (root) that most of Apple's processes do.
As for encryption, what IS encrypted on disk that you can't get from the file system includes keychain passwords, HFS journal (to undelete files, thanks to Jean-Baptiste's most awesome code), and files protected with iOS' data-protection classes. These files are few and far between. In fact, a vast majority of the evidence you'll find on an iPhone is entirely unencrypted. For the files that ARE encrypted, Jean-Baptiste's brute forcing and decryption tools allow us to extract the master encryption keys from the device. Each keychain password is encrypted with its own key ("AES wrap"); we apply the device's keys to this wrap, decrypt the password's key, then use that key to decrypt the password. Apple's data-protection classes are about the same. Each file is wrapped and we use one of the class keys to ultimately decrypt the file. This includes the few files on the device that are encrypted, such as email + attachments, and some third party data files using this encryption.
Once you unwrap that, you'll find that even applications using their own encryption code are storing keys in the keychain - so once the keychain is decrypted, the keys to these third party crypto stores are equally exposed.
The moral of the story here is that the only GOOD way to protect files is 1. To encrypt them (something Apple really doesn't do very well), 2. To have the encryption depend on a very complex key that only the owner has knowledge of and must supply in order to decrypt the files, and finally 3. To protect the device in such a way that the key cannot be intercepted by trojans or other malware. Unfortunately, iOS fails on all of these counts, making it very easy (thanks to many world class hackers contributing code) to defeat all of the encryption on the device, and MOST of the encryption even when the device is password locked.
Scary? What's scary here is just how neglected security is on mobile devices, and how easy it would be for me, or Saurik, or anybody who can use code.google.com to steal all of the data on your device in just a few minutes.
Now if you want to start discussing why "data about data" should be considered part of the data itself, that's an argument we can have... but that doesn't appear to be the goal of this article (at least if it is, he doesn't make much of an argument on that level).
It's far better to adopt the good habit of committing passwords to memory, and reduces your risk of exposure greatly. And if your data is that important that you absolutely have to protect access to it, you should be using one-time passwords or RSA keys.
Good luck!
if (lame) write_about_it; else write_about_it; notify_press; waste_my_time; act_like_a_dillweed;