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menexenus

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menexenus··on Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle's Ethics is indeed a foundational text. To simplify things greatly, there is basically only one alternative to it: Nietzsche. As Alasdair MacIntyre explains (the erstwhile Marxist, now Catholic, who helped revive virtue ethics with his book After Virtue), "the underlying structure of [Nietzsche's] argument is as follows: if there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates. There can be no place for such fictions as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. I myself must now bring into existence 'new tables of what is good'" (AV 114).

Nietzsche is commonly misread as a nihilist, but nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Nietzsche recognizes clearly that is precisely the installation of fictional moralities that is the source of nihilism, not the denial of those fictions. (This is also something that Heidegger sees clearly, e.g, in "The Letter on Humanism.")

At the end of the day, then, the question is this: Do you believe in some kind of "objective" morality that governs human life, gives meaning to our existence, and so forth? If so, then Aristotle's Ethics is by far the most cogent articulation of that view. However, if you believe that morality is just conventional, historically contingent, and a product of our "wills," then Nietzsche helps us see that clearest. To admit the latter view is not to succumb to nihilism; it is rather to free us to truly pursue the activities of greatness.

Ultimately, MacIntyre (inter alia) thinks that we have to choose. For an example of someone who, by contrast, tries to reconcile Aristotle and Nieztsche, see Hannah Arendt.

menexenus··on Nicomachean Ethics
For other readers looking at this comment, crazygringo is correct to point out that this view is a canard. If you're interested to learn what Aristotle actually wrote about these topics in the Ethics, see the following:

1) On utility, the comparison to Mill could not be more misleading. What the commenter seems to be referring to is actually Aristotle's idea of self-sufficiency, or autarkeia. For A, this is an essential component of happiness: "The complete good is held to be self-sufficient" (1097b7). To be sure, as A explains, "we do not mean by self-sufficient what suffices for someone by himself, living a solitary life ... since by nature a human being is political" (1097b7-12). Rather, "as for the self-sufficient, we posit it as that which by itself makes life choiceworthy and in need of nothing, and such is what we suppose to be" (1097b15-17). A's point here is that happiness is something that is not itself "for" anything else. Happiness is autonomous, dependent on nothing else. Indeed, it is for happiness that all other activities are directed. Organizing these activities is the province of politics, or what Aristotle calls the "architectonic" art, because it arranges and superintends everything toward the "end of our actions that we wish for on account of itself" (1094a17ff.). Thus, the commenter's remark about the "three levels of utility" is largely misguided, but it comes close-ish to capturing A's thought on the matter.

2) On "intent," Aristotle's treatment of this idea is extremely complex. It first appears at the beginning of Book III, before he begins his treatment of the eleven moral virtues, suggesting its primacy to his thinking. A separates the idea of "intent" into three kinds: "choice" (proairesis), "deliberation" (boule), and "wish" (boulesis). All of these are different kinds of voluntary activity, i.e., intentional activity. Distinguishing between them is essential for understanding the sense in which activities (and therefore virtue, and therefore happiness) is indeed an "intentional" possibility. In other words, is happiness achievable simply through our "intent"? Or is it dependent on chance, determinism, etc.? Are we truly free to become happy? A's answer to this question is complex, but his genius lies in the fact that he divides "intent" into these various forms -- in short, his point is that certain things (e.g., means vs. ends) are "decided" by different faculties of intent. This phenomenology of experience is masked today by our weak word "intent," which remains unfortunately conceptually overloaded and imprecise.

Again, I suggest that if anyone wants to know what Aristotle actually thought about these topics, they turn to the text itself.

menexenus··on Aristotle's Ethics
This is not correct.

1) It is true that for Aristotle, ethics and politics are closely linked. (Indeed, Aristotle announces in the last chapter of the Ethics that the whole book is actually the "beginning" to the Politics.) But it is not true, for Aristotle, that "you can't have a good society unless its citizens are ethical people." In Book 3, Chapter 13 of the Politics, Aristotle actually recommends excluding the most ethical people from the polis.

2) This is completely wrong. Aristotle is not expounding a "set of principles for living a rewarding life." That is the basis of the modern ethical project. Aristotle's conception of ethics is quite different. Far from providing a set of principles to obey (à la Kant, or the deontologists), Aristotle provides a set of virtues to achieve. Living the good life, for Aristotle, is not at all about following universal principles -- rather, it is about trying to achieve the proper virtue in a given situation and context.

3) This is probably wrong, especially if you mean "science" in the modern sense of the word. As Aristotle explains in Book 6, Chapter 3 of the Ethics, for him science (episteme) is actually only one of five possible ways of "attaining the truth." (The others are art/techne, prudence/phronesis, wisdom/sophia, and intellect/nous.) And it is not clear at all that the approach that Aristotle himself takes is a "scientific" one, especially considering the way that he describes the inherent limitations of his inquiry in Book 1 of the Ethics. Furthermore, Aristotle does not observe and critique the behaviors of other people so much as he does their opinions (i.e., doxa).

4) Again, the idea that Aristotle had an "empirical method" that is basically the same as the kind of argumentation that modern commentators employ is spurious. Did Aristotle look at the world around him? Of course. Does that make him an empiricist, as you describe? No.

menexenus··on Why read old philosophy?
Isn't your statement itself an absolutist statement? (I.e., that trying to discredit relativism "means" something, as a matter of fact?) If you're being ironic here, well played.
menexenus··on Why read old philosophy?
Excellent point, thank you. You are right to say that we should not conflate the "ancients" into one monolithic category. Plato and Aristotle certainly disagreed on many key points, to say nothing of their divergence from other ancient traditions beyond the geographic West (e.g., ancient Chinese or Indian philosophy).

So when I argue that "the ancients were right," it would be more correct to say "some of the ancients were right." They cannot all have been right, since they disagreed with each other! Thank you for pushing me to clarify on this point. My deeper argument, though, is that it is impossible to arbitrate who is right from the perspective of the present. That is, it would be wrong to say that Aristotle or Plato is more correct merely on the basis of what is "in line with contemporary common sense." Of course, contemporary common sense could be right, but it could also be deeply flawed. Stepping beyond the confines of the present, and looking back to the ideas of the ancients, provides a helpful counterfactual for our modern way of thinking about things. It is precisely because the ancients were arguing about problems in a way that is different than the way we think about them today that they are worth studying. Not, again, to see who is more in line with the latest advances in our current understanding of physical, cosmological, scientific theory, but rather to help reframe the very terms of debate in which those theories work.

You hit the nail on the head when you observe that there are "bizarre passages" in ancient philosophy that "make us wonder what could have motivated the question at hand." Exactly! Your very confusion on this point proves that the whole question that Plato was addressing in the Cratylus has been forgotten in modern times. Of course, from the perspective of contemporary linguistics, obviously Plato is wrong to suggest that onomatopoeia has a conceptual basis. But is that all Plato is arguing in that text? It is precisely the framing of his inquiry in the terms of modern linguistics that does a disservice to his original thought. Indeed, the very fact that the exact nature of his question has been lost, as you point out, suggests that he may have been exploring a whole separate area of inquiry.

To be sure, by returning to such an area of inquiry I don't mean to say that "philosophy ended with" the ancients. Not at all! Philosophy is not something that has an end [0]. It is, rather, a way of living in the world -- a way of being perpetually open to ideas and therefore living the best life possible. But even if it did end in some fashion, I would never argue that it ended with the Greeks. It may have started there (though this is debatable), but the Greeks only represent a sort of waypoint -- certainly not the end all, be all. The goal of the student of ancient philosophy is never to return to Plato in order to, say, reinstitute the Athenian polis today. That would be stupid. Rather, the goal in returning to Plato (for example) is to understand the precise nature of the problems he encountered, in order to then return to that point and make progress from there. This is necessary because that starting point has been covered up by modern philosophy -- it has taken a wrong turn, as it were, and has closed down other avenues worth exploring. In order to recover those avenues it is necessary to return to their original point of departure, and to take them seriously as viable alternative, not simply as wrong paths that have been "proven" erroneous by contemporary advances.

Finally, since we are talking about Plato and Aristotle, I would also just mention that it is dangerous to say "Plato said this" or "Aristotle said that." This is because Plato wrote dialogues, and always presented his apparent positions through the mouthpieces of his characters. Aristotle, too, wrote is a dialogical fashion, often couching his apparent arguments in a response to the prevailing doxa (opinions) of the time. It is difficult, therefore, to ascertain precisely what Plato (the person) or Aristotle (the person) really believed. They also contradict themselves all the time -- Plato, for example, presents his political teaching in two texts (the Republic and the Laws), which are quite different. So while he may (may) have advocated for a communist regime in the Republic, he does not do so in the Laws. Obviously this provokes confusion on the part of the reader. What did they really think then?!? However, I would say that, again, it is precisely this frustration that points back toward another way of "doing" philosophy. Today, contemporary philosophers only ever write treatises, with precise, logical arguments. (Especially in the analytic school.) But Plato shows that there are other ways to seek and present knowledge. Remembering that is itself a worthwhile reason to return to the ancients as well. (And, incidentally, the reason that the author of this post gives, though on a slightly different rationale.)

[0] Though this claim is highly debatable, I should say. Hegelians would disagree. (In this vein consider the popularized "end of history" thesis advanced by Francis Fukuyama.)

menexenus··on Why read old philosophy?
Interesting point, but I don't think you give the Bible enough credit. (For the record, I am not a believer, but I take religion quite seriously.)

First, I don't think any Christian would agree with you that "The Bible is a series of stories, genealogy and poetry, not an argument, or a dialogue that attempts to illuminate the truth, or at least points of disagreement over the truth." Of course the Bible is an illumination of truth -- that is its very foundation! The reason that the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) are also called the "revelatory" religions is that they are predicated on the idea that God reveals something true about the world, something that merely human knowledge would otherwise never be able to obtain. This is what makes religion so attractive in the first place -- it promises us a truth we could not know ourselves.

Second, this revelation of truth encompasses both the "why" and the "how," to use your terms. You are correct to say that it gives a story for "why" one might want to live a righteous life (i.e., to achieve salvation and be judged in heaven). But it also gives a explanation for "how" one should live such a life. The most obvious example of this is the Ten Commandments, but also consider other popular maxims like the ones contained in Jesus's Sermon on the Mount. Or think about how Aquinas writes an entire treatise about the differences between natural and divine law, and how the latter is given by God and instructs us on the proper way to live. The Church doesn't just make this stuff up out of thin air -- most of it is grounded in the Scripture.

So, finally, is the Bible so different from a text of ancient philosophy after all? You say that it is not remotely like the Nicomachean Ethics, but insofar as both teach something about both the "why" and the "how" to live a good life, I am not so sure. (To use your criteria of evaluation.) If you're unconvinced, perhaps consider either Plato's Republic or the Gorgias instead. In both those texts, Plato presents elaborate reasons for "why" to live in a particular way, but then concludes with an elaborate myth at the end (the Myth of Er and the Judgment of the Naked Souls). Why does he do this? Perhaps because he knows that, for many, reasoned arguments are not enough to convince. Something like a religion (i.e., a myth) is necessary to compel the masses into living in a way that is good for them. Is that so different from Christianity?

menexenus··on Why read old philosophy?
This post is misguided on so many levels. It never once occurs to the author that the reason we still study the ancients is because they were right. Like 90% of HN readers, the author tacitly assumes that old == wrong/outmoded/bygone/eclipsed. She thus concludes that the only possible reason to read the ancients is to study their methods (e.g., how Aristotle wrote) and not their actual ideas (e.g., what Aristotle wrote).

This is the same mindset that plagues the obsession with "critical thinking" in education policy today. Everyone thinks that to think "critically" means to think in a particular way, and so the best way to teach such a thing is to teach techniques of logic, reasoning, etc. Hence, on this view, ancient philosophy provides merely a source of examples of how to think about problems in a certain way. Of course, this argument goes, those problems themselves are no longer relevant (or at least the solutions that the ancients proposed to solve them are not). But it is still worthwhile to see why they were wrong, and how we have improved since then. Hurrah, "critical" thinking! We are so "advanced" in our critique!

This perspective is offensive to philosophers everywhere, and should be offensive to most people in general, if they only knew enough to be offended. It leads quickly to a path of historicism, if not relativism. "Philosophy" comes from the Greek words philos and sophia, meaning "love" and "wisdom" respectively. This tells us two important things. First, pace the author, philosophy is a way of life after all -- it "is about having certain experiences," as she puts it. This is indicated by the idea of "love" that is captured in its name. Loving is a way of being. It is not something that you "do" and "stop" and "start," like a conscious process controlled by our ego. Philosophy, accordingly, is much more than a field of academic inquiry -- it is a way of life, a way of being in the world, properly understood. Second, the object of its love -- sophia -- is important as well. Insofar as it is oriented toward wisdom, philosophy aims at something much higher than the author admits. It aims at knowledge of the whole, not simply the part [0]. Thus, it is impossible to divorce the form of philosophy from its content, as the author here wants to do. In other words, it is not merely the "how" of what Aristotle wrote that is ahistorical, transcendental, and thus still useful for readers today -- it is also the "what" that he wrote as well. We therefore must take seriously the actual content Aristotle wrote, and not simply dismiss it as eclipsed by all the "progress" we have experienced in the intervening years.

So what, precisely, did the ancients think? This is the ultimate reason to study ancient philosophy. That reason is this: The ancients saw things more clearly than we see them now. The saw the same world that we did (basic nature has not changed in 2000 years), but it disclosed itself to them in a different way, in a way that was perhaps more original and less encumbered by our modern concepts and dispositions. The ancients saw more clearly many of the fundamental problems that we still grapple with today -- for example, the tension between equality and freedom, between the right and the good, between the community and the individual. (To take examples from political philosophy.) Those problems still abide, but they are covered up in modernity and hard to see. By returning to the ancients, we can recover insight into the precise nature of those tensions, the reasons that they exist, and the reasons that they may be unsolvable. (Contra the modern/Enlightenment conceit that all problems are solvable given enough knowledge.) This doesn't mean embracing a sort of nihilism. Quite the contrary -- it means seeking out a kind of "wisdom" that is presently occluded.

For a thought experiment (though this may be hard for atheists to stomach), imagine if the author had suggested that the only reason to still read the Bible today was to understand "how" Jesus acted the way he did, or "how" God did what he did. That would be ridiculous. Of course there is more reason to read the original text than that. And Bible is a very old text indeed.

[0] For a discussion of the five different ways of knowing (episteme/techne/phronesis/nous/sophia, or science/art/prudence/intellect/wisdom) see Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, Chapter 7.