1,542 karma · joined July 15, 2010
Right now it looks difficult to implement. There's no instant "purge keys from RAM" command and shutdown is slow. Maybe aiming for a similar state to logout might be a good middle ground? Logout locks the keychain and kills apps.
On iOS you can squeeze the side buttons and Face ID's gone. Two seconds, works in your pocket. macOS has nothing like it.
PanicLock sits in your menu bar. One click (or keyboard shortcut)locks the screen but asks for a password. When you log back in Touch ID will still be active. Free, notarized and no data collection.
There's good reasons to keep Touch ID on day-to-day. It stops people watching you type your password, cameras catching it, that sort of thing. This is just for when you need it off sharpish.
More on the legal side of things (circuit split on compelled biometrics, border searches, etc.): https://paniclock.github.io
Happy to answer questions or hear what you think.
Edit: here’s a link to an example https://bsky.app/profile/seaniebyrne.bsky.social/post/3mby7j...
- they’re open source and people like me regularly read parts of their code and in some cases use their code elsewhere. Also several undergraduates and PhD’s have written research papers on the signal protocol. It’s also the subject of a lot of security research (there was a good talk at defcon this year that found some minor privacy issues with signal notifications)
- no one has built a decentralized e2ee messaging app that’s actually secure and has privacy anything like the bar Signal sets. Matrix are getting close, they’ve recently made some encouraging changes, but it will take some time to verify.
- Moxie the founder of Signal gave a talk about the challenges of building something like signal in a decentralized environment - https://youtu.be/1W5fuqySBnE
- Signal is a nonprofit. They have stated repeatedly they will shutdown the app in regions or countries that make backdoors required by law.
I saw a great Blackhat talk this year about Entra misconfiguration that got Microsoft's own sensitive internal services owned by a researcher, one of them owned by their security team. After the report they reconfigure their services, didn't pay a bounty and considered the problems solved. What about their customers making the same config errors as the Microsoft team... no changes planned.
There's much much more...
It's a priority for economic and political reasons. The Trump Tariffs and the US's policies towards Ukraine, and questionable commitment to NATO highlighted the dependencies and exposed the EU is to Trumps corrosive tactics.
The EU is quietly investing massively in diversifying away from the US market. there are trade negotiations or agreements in process (or being advanced) with countries/regions including India, the countries of the Mercosur bloc, Mexico, and Middle-East countries.
More importantly, using Microsoft at scale can leave your organization fundamentally insecure. The obscure, insecure defaults are, at best, dangerous missteps and, at worst, borderline negligent. I’m convinced that only a small fraction of enterprises using Microsoft have the expertise and budget required to secure it properly.
My personal view is that if your organization depends heavily on Microsoft, it’s not serious about security, whether they’re aware of it or not.
(Useless service status pages are incredibly annoying)
> “I don’t think it’s on a trajectory to deliver us from centralized platforms, I don’t think it will fundamentally change our relationship to technology, and I think the privacy story is already below par for the internet (which is a pretty low bar!), but I also understand why nerds like me are excited to build for it.”
> “While forensic examination of these devices is ongoing, early analysis indicates cellular communications between nation-state threat actors and individuals that are known to federal law enforcement.”
https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2025/09/us-s...