2,583 karma · joined October 2, 2018
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/vngzs; my proof: https://keybase.io/vngzs/sigs/JW88RqiRCJqnuZ_59waFsjWNKkHQ8c9ejTJR4JXX_mE ]
Comments are my opinion and not intended to represent the viewpoint of my employer (past or present).
I uninstalled the extension. I don't want to use tools that give me less power over my browsing experience, arbitrarily breaking although I'd done what was explicitly documented. I want tools that give me more power.
Vault has a similar target market. Big high-paying institutions. It's not the average market of your tech company, and 100-200 person startups generally won't need it. If you're in the fintech space, maybe you do.
> Remember, this reflects only those who pay no federal individual income tax. TPC estimates that while the number of households paying neither payroll nor income taxes also rose significantly, roughly 4 out of every 5 did pay one of these two taxes.
The trick is that "income tax" is used as a technical term in the headline, while the colloquial use of it is quite different (average readers would probably consider their payroll tax to be "income tax").
[0]: https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/covid-19-pandemic-dro...
You generally want to pair it with Consul (as Cloudflare has done) to get service discovery. Consul is also quite lightweight.
Considering the practice problems were hosted on Arxiv, this was exactly what I expected. What did you expect?
[0]: https://help.coinbase.com/en/pro/managing-my-account/account...
That said, all I really need is tmux to do my work. I use a tiling window manager as my daily driver. Don't see any reason I'd adopt a floating WM in the terminal except that it looks cool.
Expecting "privacy" from such a device is absurd. You waived it when you bought the device.
The technical barrier to entry for accruing and using breach databases is near-zero [2], same with the barrier to SMS fraud. Both are routine and easy methods for criminal groups with no special technical abilities, and therefore they are likely. Since the onus is on Coinbase to do identity verification in account recovery, a large number of successful takeovers would be a "flaw" in their process, even if it's not a technical flaw (which I would expect to be expressed in language like "vulnerability").
Accepting untrusted, unauthenticated user input as a SMS verification number would be a serious login-related flaw, and certainly Coinbase pentests their login pages. Any competent pentester would discover such a flaw. So between "Coinbase shipped a critical and obvious login flaw to prod" and "a routine and common criminal tactic was employed successfully against them," I find the latter more likely.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28720101
What makes you believe a specific exploit like that existed against Coinbase's 2FA? And if it existed, then why wasn't that caught in a routine pentest?
[0]: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/can-we-stop-pretending-s...
[1]: https://lucky225.medium.com/its-time-to-stop-using-sms-for-a...
From the telco's perspective, they have a responsibility to stop SMS and SIM fraud, and our regulations have failed to properly hold them accountable in this domain.
I would add that the users have some responsibility for losing their emails/passwords, but my initial framing insufficiently demands responsibility for the service providers in this instance. The service providers should be expected to take all reasonable steps to prevent fraud on their platforms, and that should include extra scrutiny of SMS-based authentication mechanisms (e.g., identity verification). This is why Coinbase paid them back, accepting some responsibility for the fraud.
However, around the time of the breach date (March - May 2021), there were a number of "B2B" services that offered a "type in any SMS number and you will get all text messages to that number," type feature intended for customer support teams to use for shared SMS access. Those systems often had privileged access to telcos and were regularly exploited by attackers to break 2FA without even a SIM swap [1]. With those tools, stealing all SMS to a number required only intent, not conversations with telco support personnel.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28720280
[1]: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/can-we-stop-pretending-s...
The "flaw," in my reading of it, was to support SMS-based account recovery at all. But I'm not necessarily right here, and open to alternatives.
> Even with the information described above, additional authentication is required in order to access your Coinbase account. However, in this incident, for customers who use SMS texts for two-factor authentication, the third party took advantage of a flaw in Coinbase’s SMS Account Recovery process in order to receive an SMS two-factor authentication token and gain access to your account.
My guess is, because funds were stolen from users' accounts, the CA breach notification laws apply and this needed to be disclosed as such. However, that doesn't necessarily mean that Coinbase was technically "breached," only that customer accounts were compromised.
If the attacker controls your personal email associated with Coinbase, accompanying passwords, and phone number, and you use SMS 2FA, then your funds were stolen. Otherwise, they were safe. That's my reading of the article.
[0]: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/08/who-owns-your-wireless-s...
Edit: California, not Canada. My bad.
At a high level, I agree - our tools should do this for us, we shouldn't need people to be experts in untrusted input handling to work effectively with it.
Google internalized this and built their own modular library that they use for all UI development that just makes this completely opaque to the developers. So they don't have most frontend input handling bugs, or if they do they get fixed for everyone at once in the framework layer.
I would encourage most security-conscious users to enable it and migrate to recent podman over using Docker, assuming a sufficiently recent kernel. The latest batch of major Linux OS releases have all enabled kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone, so Red Hat, Canonical et al seem to agree.
For those interested, though, you can read the anatomy of a userns clone() vulnerability here:
In my opinion, it should be as easy to unsubscribe as it is to subscribe. I interpret anything else as consumer-hostile. It's very strange coming from NY Times ... I know they find it hard to finance journalism nowadays, but dark patterns are never the answer.
[0]: https://go.flashpoint-intel.com/docs/pricing-analysis-of-goo...