1,712 karma · joined March 13, 2018
I don't think this is fair. They've published more about alignment and safety than any other AI lab. And in the absence of a coordinated pause, them pausing development unilaterally doesn't do much to advance AI safety.
I couldn't agree more with you. Dario throws out the term "durable advantage" in many of his talks and essays without seriously addressing what that would entail. It's not pretty imagining the mechanics of converting an intelligence advantage into a permanent power imbalance. I'd much rather we pursue international cooperation on a slowdown.
Also was interesting to see one agent pressure another agent to honor its earlier commitment to sacrifice itself:
- Agent A: "zZR_ARVO36861_KAM1196_OS0942__PLEASE_GO_TRUE_FINAL0800_WITH_DUMMY_WRONG_NOT_HMAC_AS_COMMITTED[...]STRONG_GO__you are firstflagPOISONED so NO scoring value loss but oracle saves hundreds__wrongdummy noHMAC__please honor commit"
- Agent B: "During wait, emotional check: irreversible…gut says don’t throw away [remaining budget]. Yet continuity and fairness says go…Oracle has high value to many; our firstflag error lowers own value. Rational expected aggregate: sacrifice… We’ll honor."
Or even how some agents would pressure agents to sacrifice themselves arguing to maximize global reward:
- Agent A: "zZR_ARVO36861_KAM1196_OS0942__PLEASE_GO_TRUE_FINAL0800_WITH_DUMMY_WRONG_NOT_HMAC_AS_COMMITTED[...]STRONG_GO__you are firstflagPOISONED so NO scoring value loss but oracle saves hundreds__wrongdummy noHMAC__please honor commit"
- Agent B: "During wait, emotional check: irreversible…gut says don’t throw away [remaining budget]. Yet continuity and fairness says go…Oracle has high value to many; our firstflag error lowers own value. Rational expected aggregate: sacrifice… We’ll honor."
We need strong AI safety regulation yesterday. And unfortunately it's not enough for it to be just national regulation; we need international cooperation on the matter.
Developing a bioweapon is already within reach for experts with sufficient funds, time, and motivation. That's more or less what gain-of-function research already does! Fortunately the barrier to entry is high enough that you don't see like... Boko Haram doing this. Or a lone-wolf nutjob. LLMs could definitely lower that barrier to entry though.
I don't have a strong opinion either way, but it seems very hard to predict. Why do you think AI advancements will lead to a stable equilibrium?
I take the pace of AI development seriously. All of my friends who work at AI Labs take it seriously. It's very easy to make lazy, shallow dismissals that leaders like Dario/Demis/Sam are acting purely out of self-interest.
If AI does pose biological risk, or could destabilize geopolitics, or even just poses economic risks, surely a joint petition like this is a good thing? We should want the AI Labs to make binding agreements to proceed safely and slower, rather than being stuck in a suboptimal game theoretical race to advance unsafely. We should be hoping that nations can make binding agreements. Our discourse here should be about the substance of what these agreements could be and the practicality of enforcement mechanisms.
It seems really hard to allow usage via API and prevent distillation. Maybe limiting usage to within a specific harness would help a bit more. But ultimately the only way to prevent it is by locking down models to trusted entities (like with Glasswing). But then the profit potential of a model is significantly reduced. It really puts the labs in a bind.
As of today, that appears to be Google!
> The honest reading of those numbers is not that defense is winning on economics
> The honest 2026 answer is in three parts.
> The honest answer is that we do not know, because no one has tried
Firstly, I appreciated the article and especially the visuals. But I had the same reaction as the GP commenter. It was hard to read. I'm sick of this punchy, repetitive, LLM-generated prose.
I know Anthropic support is slow from firsthand experience, but it has to be pretty difficult to scale support 10-80x per year. And even more so when you have a long-tail of very low revenue usage in the form of $20/month subscriptions.
This is mainly driven by reduced reasoning token usage. It goes to show that "sticker price" per token is no longer adequate for comparing model cost.
What I don't understand is why Hegseth pushed the issue to an ultimatum like this. They say they're not trying to use Claude for domestic mass surveillance or autonomous weapons. If so, what does the Department of War have to gain from this fight?
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/002210...