2,189 karma · joined January 10, 2021
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ECHELON
[2] https://www.theregister.com/2001/05/31/what_are_those_words/
That said, if you're using your own EC2/lightsail instance you won't see as many CAPTCHAs as, say, using a commodity VPN service.
Given you can't detect a VPN per-se (if configured properly) usually the way it works is that the destination node knows you're coming from a source IP from a known VPN-supplier's well-known IP-block.
If you go for this kind of setup (running your own VPN on AWS) you're simply changing your ISP to Amazon. They still might (and probably will) be monitoring egress traffic at the very least to perform any kind of incident analysis.
We used to have a shortage of meeting rooms when having them physically and locally. This was great as it meant they naturally spread out over the week. Nowadays folk think they can get you to hop on a virtual meeting room in minutes regardless of what you’re doing.
I’m very good at declining meetings where I think I’ll not be offering much value giving a reason why. I find quite often people want me in because they think I’ll enjoy it, or don’t want me out of the loop. They can summarise after by email if that’s all they want.
Firstly it wasn’t me that made that observation but..
I don’t think fairness comes into it. If you’re concerned with that risk, use something else. All security comes with a set of trade offs and knowing which risks you’re protected from and which you are not, helps you make that choice.
ProtonMail are also very good at publishing their threat model, architecture and technical implementation as well as large parts being open-source.
> What protonmail tries to solve is your mail being encrypted at rest.
Actually it does better than that. It uses message-level encryption using PGP keys to provide that encryption at rest. Which in theory gives them zero access. Lots of services which tout encryption at rest are actually encrypting the block storage which mitigates against fewer and less likely threats.
Ah yes this is a good point. The only way to be sure is to client side end-to-end encrypt your data before you send it to any upstream mail service. E.g. using S/MIME or PGP. At this point you can then use any free mail service as you now “only” need to worry about leaked mail header meta-data.
Apple's private relay feature is good but they also suffer from recent trust issues.
Regarding the last point, yes if you send PM-Non-PM there will be plaintext email sitting in the Non-PM's inbox/sent items. But you do have the ability to send non-PM recipients password protected email where they have to read the email over at PM in their browser. Only a link to it sent by email and they need to know the password to access it.
Obviously it depends on your threat model, but if you're doing anything that sensitive you should probably not be using email as there's no way of truly making it secure to use.
Some people will be using protonmail just because they don't want their provider scanning their emails or targeting them with ads. PM do offer a free tier so they're not a bad choice for that use case.
I was thinking the same. It's not been a good few weeks for them. They're quickly losing trust which was hard to acquire in the first place given their history. Maybe a timely reminder to mention Halloween [1] ?
They do have this design for their VPN if you enable their killswitch feature.
I believe it has them already? There's no reason they can't put an inline transparent Tor bridge in front of their mail infra to anonymise all inbound traffic i.e. TCP/IP->Tor Node->Tor Node->ProtonMail so it could only ever capture IPs coming from it's own Tor-node if compelled to do so. However it would still have an ability to log on the TCP/IP transparent endpoint. This risk could be mitigated by using their onion address [2] and using someone else's tor nodes.
The data-at-rest already is zero-access[1]. There is encryption of data-in-transit but no zero-knowledge network layer.. maybe they could work on this since they have support for tor [2]?
[1] https://protonmail.com/blog/zero-access-encryption/
[2] https://protonmailrmez3lotccipshtkleegetolb73fuirgj7r4o4vfu7...
[1] https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-governments-tur...
[2] https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2021/Ransom...
"The server was compromised, and they were looking for me," 0_neday wrote on a cybercrime forum last weekend and first spotted by security firm Recorded Future. "Good luck, everyone; I'm off." [1]
[1] https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-governments-tur...
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/jun/06/us-milita...
[alias]
undo = reset HEAD~1 --mixed
https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/features/n...
Though obviously there is still some shared responsibility and it's no panacea - but has had a noticeable impact on the ordering of the OWASP list.
Wonder how many people just now shoot on their iPhone 12/13 at least for snaps.
BUT the interoperability (when it works) and the native stack implementations (Android, iOS, Windows, MacOS) though nice for admins, is only owing to it’s prevalence in enterprise rather than any superiority as a standard.
Wireguard on the other hand is secure or off.
Much better off using Rider (also works nicely on Linux).