To put it another way, suppose that, planning ahead, I install an electric strike that allows me to "buzz in" people. Then what I would like to do is be able to "buzz in" using a smartphone app, say.
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To put it another way, suppose that, planning ahead, I install an electric strike that allows me to "buzz in" people. Then what I would like to do is be able to "buzz in" using a smartphone app, say.
After this happened a couple of times I got wise to the strategy. The phone screen was useless. Someone would prompt the person with the right answer. The resume and references also useless, filled with unconfirmable or suspect information.
I gained a little appreciation for what HR professionals have to do and lost a bit of my naivete that people won't try to represent expertise to someone who actually has that expertise.
The language was SAS.
And that's why, I suspect, no null hypothesis is stated or tested.
Accordingly, Bayesianism can be treated with suspicion-- since the P(h) is arbitrarily specified, one could "load the dice" and obtain a P(h|e) ("posterior probability") guaranteed to suit the analyst's conclusions.
By differentiating the two creatures, tjradcliffe hopes to resolve the dis-ease with calling P(h|e) a "probability". By frequentist philosophy, probabilities should be grounded in some sort of firm soil, e.g., the relative frequency of what would be observed if one could conduct an experiment ad infinitum. A Bayesian "probability" is not grounded this way, so calling it a "plausibility" instead would resolve this tension.
Another way of putting this-- P(h) to a frequentist feels like a tainted probability-- really not a probability at all-- so even after updating the prior probability with data [i.e., P(e|h)/P(e)], the posterior probability P(h|e) still retains the influence of that original taint. Solution: stop calling the Bayesian probabilities "probabilities"; instead, call them "plausibilities".
No, I did not find that the classes were significantly more effective in transferring knowledge in either type of school. My impression was this: depending on the school, the class may be more "ambitious", i.e., may cover a little bit more material. However, many times the material is basically the same, especially in the introductory classes.
The main pedagogical effects of going to a prestigious school is: (1) Your classmates tend to be stronger students. They tend to be a little smarter, harder-working, more interested and engaged. Yet you can find the same type of people in less-prestigious schools, although there are fewer, percentage-wise. (2) Your professors tend to have accomplished more in their field of study. However, this often does not translate to having better classes than other schools. You could have lots of crappily-taught classes even if you're attending the most prestigious school in the world if that school (or a department within that school) does not care that much about educating its students. (3) You might have a little more variety in the interesting things you could learn in upper-level or graduate-level courses. (These things tend to be very department-specific, rather than school-specific.)
Off-topic observation: MOOCs are democratizing education nowadays. Ten years ago, say, if I wanted to take a thorough, competent class on database query languages, I would have to pray my institution, or another, sister institution, offered a class in that topic. Nowadays, I can go to Stanford's Class2Go website. I don't need to spend any time (a) applying to Stanford, (b) pray that I get admitted, (c) if admitted move to Palo Alto, (d) wait for that class to be taught, and (e) focus on that class while taking four other classes. Today I can stay where I am and take that class at any time.
One thing that Obamacare is supposed to do, and it seems that it has done this in general, is make sure that the insurance plan you purchase (via monthly premiums) is worthwhile. Health insurance is cognitively difficult to evaluate, and before the Affordable Care Act many people purchased plans that offered rather poor coverage because these plans had very low premiums. (Many people are either unable or unwilling to learn the details of their health plan, or if they know the details don't mind gambling, so these types of "you think you have insurance, until you have a calamity" plans flourished.)
The ACA is supposed to prevent people from buying these "lemons" by outlawing these plans. So some plans offered by insurers were supposed to be discontinued, i.e., you couldn't stay on them, but others were "grandfathered", i.e., you could stay on them because they met the minimum qualifications set.
Obama got into a lot of trouble because he said (paraphrasing) that if you liked your health plan, you could keep it, which was false. So politically he had to backtrack and now, for the next two years, whether a plan meets the ACA standards is irrelevant, you can keep your plan regardless of how lousy it may or may not be.
It sounds, as DavidAdams speculates, that you are in a very low-risk pool, which is certainly possible. You are on the right side of 30 and may have a great medical history, which puts you in "very low risk" pool, in which case the premium you're being charged could make actuarial sense for the insurer. However, what you have not yet experienced is the flip side of age bracketing and the inevitable detriments to your health that eventually will occur. Once you turn 30, you will be in a new bracket, and your premium will go up. Percentage-wise, it will be considerable, but since you're starting from such a low base it will be modest in an absolute sense. However, as the years accumulate, assuming your plan has been grandfathered, you will likely notice that these premium increases will start accumulating to the point where you may feel the insurer is gouging you.
That is, unless the ACA remains the law of the land, in which you can just sign up for one of the Obamacare plans to join a better risk pool than the one the insurer has placed you in.
So from a game-theoretical perspective, assuming your plan is grandfathered, you should stay on it as long as you can, until the premium increases to the point to where switching to an Obamacare plan makes financial sense. This assumes that your insurer has no grounds for rescission (i.e., to retroactively rescind its coverage of your health care costs because you misled them about your medical history at enrollment). If there are grounds, then the "guaranteed issue" aspect of Obamacare plans becomes attractive.
Aetna is not in the business of losing money on the policies it issues. I can only think that either (1) you have failed to mention attributes of your health plan that are less than ideal (e.g., coverage cap of $25,000, but you claim that you have no coverage limit(?)), (2) that you have been placed in a very low risk pool, or (3) that you have a significant subsidy that allows to you to purchase a plan that would seem to be actuarially unsound for a for-profit company like Aetna.
Through my experience as a dog owner (er, dog guardian), I am convinced that dogs experience emotion and are capable of some deductive reasoning. Yet they are generally incapable of comprehending the entire human world around them. It's as if you perpetually have a two-year-old's brain in a furry, four-legged adult's body.
While the author argues that dogs should be treated more like people, e.g., with the freedom to choose what they will or will not do, he fails to note the opposite tack-- that the choices of two-year-olds must be constrained at times for their own safety and well-being and that the behavior of dogs and two-year-olds is modified-- often for their benefit-- through the use of positive and negative reinforcement.
Only if we could gain more thorough understanding of the emotions that dogs experience can we make good decisions of how they best should be treated.
The principle behind the proscription against multiple comparisons is well-known to statisticians. If we consider a 1 chance in 20 result to be statistically significant, then, randomly, on average 20 "trials" will yield one statistically significant result.
By dividing the patients into disease severity subgroups, Dr. Harkonen increased the number of "trials" from 1 to 4, thereby elevating the likelihood of yielding an effect that appeared to be statistically significant. If he also examined other subgroups in his quest to find a positive result, then he elevated the likelihood of finding a positive result toward certainty.
Our desire to find patterns and see cause and effect make us prone to confirmation bias. We can guard against this bias with care, including the use of statistics. It was not a surprise that a subsequent study looking only at the "mild-to-moderate" group did not demonstrate any benefit of the treatment. The belief that the treatment would benefit "mild-to-moderate" patients was speciously derived.
It is well-known to statistically-minded people that p-values are computations that rely on particular assumptions being made. One of those assumptions is that only a single, pre-specified hypothesis is being tested. By making additional comparisons, the p-value that was reported by Dr. Harkonen mis-represented the true significance of the trial. Perhaps factually the p-value was 0.004, but publicizing the p-value as if it were obtained by a fair trial, as opposed to finding it in a hunt for (quasi-)statistical significance, was a manipulation of the facts to support one's personal interests. That's not science; it's bias, and self-serving bias at that.
I also have noted that South Asians have a strong culture that resists rote Westernization, which I attribute to native Indians (etc.) learning over time about what to sustain and what to adopt from the culture of their British overlords. So I conclude that when South Asians emigrate to America, they have a "leg up" in adopting to American culture, while East Asians experience culture shock to a much greater degree. Not only is the language more unfamiliar, but East Asians don't have the historical/cultural experience of keeping their culture separate from a Western culture as South Asians do. As an example, look at the relative interest of children of immigrants in the USA's National Spelling Bee.
I therefore think that because of these reasons, and because I think East Asian immigrants are as bright as South Asian immigrants, that we will observe a bolus of super-successful East Asian immigrants one generation later than when we observe a bolus of super-successful South Asian immigrants.
Now obviously these observation are generalizations, but I suspect that the "strong accent" observation of PG is not just a proxy for facility with English but a measure of cultural adaptation than may be helpful in becoming successful in the USA.
(1) To allow people to compare apples to apples by having, in the exchange, groups of plans that offer the same coverage.
In the current individual insurance marketplace, it is basically impossible to compare policies because they all differ on many different details, and finding out those details is a laborious, unrewarding, and confusing slog.
(2) To make sure that the plans in the exchanges would be considered insurance to a rational person. Right now, the individual market has a lot of low premium plans (i.e., plans for which you don't have to pay very much per month) which are next to useless when you actually NEED the insurance, because they don't cover very much at all. The idea is to maintain minimum standards of coverage so if you ever are in a situation when you really NEED insurance, you actually will HAVE insurance.
That being said, health claims such as the ones you cite-- "it automatically puts you at an optimal weight, makes you feel full, and improves your focus and cognition"-- fall into the realm of regulated speech. You shouldn't be making claims like these without well-controlled clinical trials to back them up. The sellers of Soylent will need to hire legal counsel before long...